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INTRODUCnON
Aside from getting himself impeached but not removed, President
William J. Clinton's most noteworthy impact on the Constitution has
been in the area of war powers. In March 1999, President Clinton or-
dered 31,000 American servicemen and women to engage in air op-
erations against Serbia, the largest and most powerful province of the
former Yugoslavia, to prevent the "ethnic cleansing" of Albanians liv-
ing in Kosovo. As part of an operation sponsored by the North Atlan-
tic Treaty Organization ("NATO"), 7000 American ground troops
then entered Kosovo on June 10, 1999, after NATO bombing had
forced Serbia to withdraw its forces. It is unclear how long American
troops will remain, as NATO's goals include not just ending war but
building a new nation in Kosovo.
While broader in scale and destructiveness, President Clinton's
Kosovo operation followed a pattern set by similar military interven-
tions over the last eight years. In 1993, President Clinton expanded
the goals of the 28,000 American troops in Somalia, originally de-
ployed by President Bush for humanitarian reasons, but then with-
drew them after the deaths of soldiers in combat. Then, in 1994,
President Clinton sent 16,000 American troops to Haiti, under the
auspices of the U.N., to oversee its transition to democratic govern-
ment. Since December 1995, as many as 20,000 American troops have
implemented a U.N.-brokered peace plan in Bosnia, another province
of the former Yugoslavia. American war planes continue to enforce a
no-fly zone in Iraq, and on occasion American cruise missiles and
bombs have attacked Iraqi military assets. In the summer of 1998,
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President Clinton again used cruise missiles, this time to hit suspected
terrorist targets in Sudan and Afghanistan. On President Clinton's
watch, American troops also have participated in U.N. peacekeeping
missions in dangerous places such as Macedonia and Rwanda.
The Clinton administration did not receive congressional authori-
zation for its decisions to use force abroad in any of these cases. To
the contrary, the President has justified his military interventions
more often on the need to uphold our obligations to the United Na-
tions or NATO, than upon congressional approval. Although on sev-
eral occasions Congress refused to authorize the use of force, Presi-
dent Clinton argued that he had the sole constitutional power as
commander-in-chief to send American servicemen and women into
harm's way. While he often signaled that he would welcome congres-
sional support, he also made clear that he would implement his mili-
tary plans without it. President Clinton further refused to acknowl-
edge that the War Powers Resolution bound his discretion to act. The
Clinton administration has rendered the War Powers Resolution a
dead letter.
This Article discusses the constitutional implications of the
Clinton administration's war power activities. Part I explains that
President Clinton's claim of unilateral executive war power, while at
times rhetorically overbroad, is supported by the Constitution's text
and original understanding. In creating a flexible system of war pow-
ers, the Constitution allows the President to exercise significant initia-
tive in war matters, while providing Congress with ample authority to
check presidential adventurism by refusing to fund military opera-
tions. Congress had a full opportunity to prevent President Clinton
from deploying the armed forces in Kosovo. It simply chose, as a po-
litical matter, not to.
Part II considers whether the administration's unilateral decisions
to use force can find support in the Constitution, and responds to
scholarly criticism of recent executive warmaking. Events have shown
again that international law scholars, the vast majority of whom be-
lieve that Congress must authorize all offensive uses of force,' have
I See, e.g., LouIs FIsHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER 185-206 (1995); JOHN HART
ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY: CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF VIETNAM AND ITS
AFrERMATH 3-5 (1993); MICHAEL J. GLENNON, CONSTITUTIONAL DIPLOMAcY 80-84
(1990); LOUIS HENKIN, CONsTrrUTIONA!SM, DEMOCRACY, AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS 109
(1990); HAROLD HONGju KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURrITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING
POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRAAFFAIR 158-61 (1990); Louis Fisher, Unchecked Presiden-
tial Wars, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1637 (2000) [hereinafter Fisher, Unchecked Presidential
Wars]; William Michael Treanor, Fame, the Founding, and the Power to Declare War, 82
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failed to describe reality or to remain consistent in their criticism of
executive warmaking
This Article also examines the constitutional implications of the
increasingly multilateral nature of the American use of force. Kosovo
and other Clinton-era operations, in which the American military par-
ticipates as part of multinational forces under international mandate,
may prove to be the model for the future. Part III addresses whether
the Constitution imposes any limitations on the President's ability to
send American troops to serve under international command. It then
turns to two other questions raised by Kosovo involving the relation-
ship between international law and presidential power: whether the
President gains any constitutional authority vis-&-vis Congress when
using force pursuant to treaty, and whether the President may violate
international law in the course of ordering the military to intervene
abroad. Kosovo is a demonstration of the President's freedom to pur-
sue the goals of multilateral organizations, even to the point of waging
war either without congressional authorization or in violation of in-
ternational law. Nonetheless, the Constitution places limits on the
federal government's ability to cooperate with international organiza-
tions, particularly in its restrictions on delegating authority under fed-
eral law to non-U.S. officers, and in Congress's discretion to use the
legislative power to block presidential foreign policy. Thus, Kosovo
provides only an uncertain precedent for the future. On the one
hand, it reaffirms the President's unilateral authority to use force, but
on the other hand, it does not justify the further internationalization
of American military intervention.
I. AMERICAN INTERVENTION IN Kosovo
This Part discusses the constitutional issues that have surrounded
the Clinton administration's use of force abroad. It begins by briefly
sketching out the constitutional allocation of powers and recent prac-
tice by the three branches of government. As events in Kosovo may
set the paradigm for future multilateral military interventions, I focus
my comments on its details.
CORNL L. REv. 695, 699-700 (1997); Jane E. Stromseth, Understanding Constitutional
War Powers Today: Why Methodology Matters, 106YALE LJ. 845, 848-49 (1996) (book re-
view).
2 I explore elsewhere the reasons why international legal scholars have been in-
consistent concerning Kosovo. SeeJohn C. Yoo, The Dogs That Didn't Bark: Why Were
International Legal Scholars MLA on Kosovo , 1 CHM. J. INT'L L. (forthcoming 2000) (copy
on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review) [hereinafter Yoo, Legal Scholars
MIA].
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A. War Powers in Practice
While the constitutional text divides the warmaking power be-
tween the President and Congress, it does not explicitly declare which
branch must act first to initiate hostilities. Article II vests in the Presi-
dent the commander-in-chief power, the power to send and receive
ambassadors, and all of the other executive powers of the United
States.3 Article I grants Congress the authority "to declare War, grant
Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures
on Land and Water," to raise and fund the military, and to organize
the military.4 Congress also enjoys other foreign affairs powers, such
as the authority to regulate international commerce, to enact immi-
gration laws, and to pass laws to punish piracy.5 The federal courts
have no special role in warmaking, aside from their jurisdiction over
cases arising under the Constitution, treaties, and federal laws, and
controversies involving ambassadors, admiralty, and maritime law, and
diversity suits with foreign states or citizens.6 Finally, Article I, Section
10 of the Constitution wholly excludes the states from matters involv-
ing war, unless they receive congressional permission or are threat-
ened with invasion.
A modern system of warmaking has evolved around this formal
distribution of constitutional powers that allows presidents to take the
initiative in military hostilities.8 Pro-Congress scholars claim that uni-
lateral presidential warmaking violates Congress's sole possession of
the power to declare war. Congress, however, has used that authority
only five times in the nation's history. Meanwhile, presidents have
committed forces to combat at least 125 times in the Republic's 210
year history, although most of these interventions were either small in
scale or had received legislative support 9 Since World War II, presi-
3 See U.S. CONST. art. II, §§ 1-2.
4 Id. art. I, § 8.
See id. art. I, §§ 3, 4, 10.
6 See id. art. III,§ 2.
7 See id. art. I, § 10.
8I am not here arguing that modem practice itself can provide a constitutional
justification for presidential warmaking in Kosovo. Rather, I am merely showing, de-
scriptively, that Kosovo is consistent with the way the branches have conducted war-
making. Later, I will argue that the constitutional system of war powers is sufficiently
flexible to permit this modern working system of war powers. Seeinfra Part II.D.
9 See OFFICE OF THE LEGAL ADVISER, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, THE LEGALITY OF
UNITED STATES PARTICIPATION IN THE DEFENSE OF VIET-NAM (1966), reprinted in 1 THE
VIETNAM WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAw 583, 597 (Richard A. Falk ed., 1968) (citing
'at least 125 instances" of force without Congress's approval); see also CONGRESSIONAL
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dents have expanded upon this practice by sending the armed forces
into several major conflicts without congressional authorization. In
the Korean War, President Truman consciously chose to rely upon his
commander-in-chief and executive powers to send troops, rather than
seek legislative permission.0 Likewise, in Vietnam, PresidentJohnson
only received the at best ambiguous Tonkin Gulf Resolution" as a sign
12of congressional support, which was declaration of war.
Post-Vietnam efforts by Congress to control presidential warmak-
ing by statute have met with little success. In 1973, Congress enacted
the War Powers Resolution ("WPR"), which prohibits the president
from introducing the American military into hostilities, whether ac-
tual or imminent, without either a declaration of war, specific statu-
tory authorization, or an attack on the United States or its forces.'s
The WPR requires a president to "consult with Congress" before send-
ing the armed forces into hostilities and to report to Congress within
forty-eight hours of sending the military into hostilities.14 Sixty days• • 15
after the report, the President must terminate the intervention.
Presidents have never acknowledged the WPR's constitutionality,
and their recent actions have ignored its terms. Presidents Ford and
Carter never expressly recognized the Resolution's binding force, and
President Reagan refused to comply with the Resolution when he or-
dered the use of force in Lebanon, Grenada, Libya, and the Persian
Gulf.16 Like the presidents before him, President Bush sent messages
RESEARCH SERviCE, INSTANCES OF USE OF UNTED STATES ARMED FORCES ABROAD,
1789-1989 (Ellen C. Collier ed., 1989), reprinted in THOMAS M. FRANCK & MICHAELJ.
GLENNON, FOREIGN RELATIONS AND NATIONAL SECuRrIY LAW 650 (2d ed. 1993) (list-
ing "215 times that the United States has utilized military forces abroad," some of
which were "conducted solely under the President's powers as Chief Executive or
Commander in Chief').
10 See John C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The Original Under-
standing of War Powers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 167, 178-79 (1996) [hereinafter Yoo, Original
Understanding] ("Secretary of State Dean Acheson and Senate Majority Leader Scott
Lucas both convinced Truman to rely on his Commander-in-Chief powers to support
his actions .. ").
1 Pub. L. No. 88-408, 78 Stat. 384 (1964).
1There is substantial dispute among pro-Congress scholars concerning whether
the Tonkin Gulf Resolution constituted sufficient legislative support for the Vietnam
War. SeeJohn C. Yoo, Clio at War The Misuse of Histoy in the War Powers Debate, 70 U.
COLO. L. REv. 1169, 1178 n.32 (1999) [hereinafterYoo, Clio].
is See War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973) (codified at
50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (1994)).
14 See id. §§ 3, 4(a).
15 See id. § 5(b). The Resolution provides the President with 30 additional days if
necessary to permit a safe withdrawal. See id.
16 See Yoo, Original Understanding, supra note 10, at 181 (noting that Presidents
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notifying Congress of military interventions in Panama and the Per-
sian Gulf that were "consistent with" the Resolution, but that did not
obey it. During the Gulf War, President Bush dispatched troops to the
Middle East for well longer than permitted by the WPR's sixty day
clock. 17 Even as he asked for a congressional sign of support, Presi-
dent Bush argued that he already had the constitutional authority to
implement U.N. Security Council Resolution 678, which asked mem-
ber states to use "all necessary means" to force Iraqi troops out of Ku-
wait.1
Use of force under the Clinton administration has only further
undermined the WPR. In 1994, pursuant to U.N. mandate, President
Clinton planned a military intervention in Haiti, despite a unanimous
Senate resolution declaring that he had no authorization to do so.
Stating that he had sufficient independent constitutional authority,
Clinton sent 20,000 American troops to supervise the transition to a
democratic government in violent conditions. Five years later, those
troops are only now winding down their deployment. 19 In 1993, the
administration began its long involvement in the Balkans by sending
American warplanes to enforce a no-fly zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina.
That same year, the President dispatched American troops to Mace-
donia as part of a U.N. peacekeeping operation. In February 1994,
sixty American warplanes conducted airstrikes against Serbian targets
in order to bring about an end to the conflict in Bosnia, again pursu-
ant to U.N. authorization. In December 1995, President Clinton or-
dered the deployment of 20,000 American troops to Bosnia to imple-
ment a peace agreement; at least 6000 American servicemen and
Ford, Carter, and Reagan only "took note of," or acted in ways "consistent with," and
simply rejected compliance with the WPR, respectively).
President Bush sent troops to Saudi Arabia within days of the August 2, 1990
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and engaged in a build-up that reached more than 430,000
troops by November 8, but did not receive a congressional resolution of support until
January 12, 1991, more than five months after the first American deployment. Ameri-
can troops invaded Kuwait and Iraq shortly thereafter. Seeid. at 186-88.
isWhen he signed Congress's joint resolution supporting the use of force to im-
plement U.N. Resolution 678, H.R.J. Res. 77, 102d Cong. (1991) (enacted), Bush de-
clared that "my signing this resolution does not[] constitute any change in the long-
standing positions of the executive branch on either the President's constitutional
authority to use the Armed Forces to defend vital U.S. interests or the constitutionality
of the War Powers Resolution." Statement on Signing the Resolution Authorizing the
Use of Military Force Against Iraq, 27 WEEKLYCOMP. PRES. Doc. 48 (Jan. 14, 1991).
19 See Steven L. Myers, Full-Time U.S. Force in Haiti To Leave an Unstable Nation, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 26, 1999, at Al (describing the withdrawal of American troops from
Haiti).
2000] WAR POWERS AND THE MULTILATERAL HFTURE
women remain there today In addition to the Balkans, President
Clinton has twice engaged several limited uses of force against Iraq
and against terrorist targets in Afghanistan and the Sudan, mostly
through the use of airstrikes by warplanes and cruise missiles. In all of
these crises, the administration acted without statutory authorization
and instead claimed support from the U.N. or NATO. Troops have
participated in several of these operations well beyond the time limits
demanded by the WPR, with little congressional sanction or efforts at
enforcement.
B. Kosovo
This pattern of executive initiative and legislative acquiescence
culminated in the American intervention in Kosovo. A province of
the former Yugoslavia, Kosovo was inhabited both by ethnic Albanians
and Serbs.2 1 While under communist control, Kosovo gained substan-
tial autonomy within the Yugoslavian federal structure, and Albanians
assumed the overwhelming majority of the population. Under Slobo-
dan Milosevic, however, Yugoslavia in the late 1980s eliminated
Kosovo's independent status and imposed a harsh authoritarian rule.
In 1998, Serbia launched a crackdown in Kosovo that killed dozens of
Albanians and led thousands of others to flee. By Spring 1999,
NATO-led efforts to broker a diplomatic peace between Albanian
Kosovars and the Serbian government had failed.2
In March 1999, Serbian military forces began a broad offensive
aimed at driving the Albanian population out of the province. Most
Albanians went into hiding, fled to neighboring countries, or were
killed or detained2 On March 23, after the Clinton administration's
special envoy left Belgrade with no hope for a negotiated settlement,
the Senate passed (but the House did not), by a vote of fifty-eight to
forty-one, a concurrent resolution authorizing the President to "con-
duct military air operations and missile strikes in cooperation with our
NATO allies against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Montenegro) .4 On March 24, American warplanes, in conjunction
20 See id. (noting that the Pentagon was drawing up plans to reduce the number of
American troops in Bosnia from 6200 to 4000).




24 S. Con. Res. 21, 106th Cong. (1999).
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with other NATO forces, began attacking Serbian forces in Kosovo.2
In a nationally televised address, President Clinton argued that air-
strikes were necessary to protect innocent Albanians, to prevent the
conflict from spreading to the rest of Europe, and to act with our
European allies in maintaining peace. 6 President Clinton declared
that the military's mission would be "to demonstrate NATO's serious-
ness of purpose," to "deter an even bloodier offensive against inno-
cent civilians in Kosovo," and "to seriously damage the Serbian mili-
tary's capacity to harm the people of Kosovo."2 7 American air and
missile operations expanded beyond Serbian units in Kosovo to in-
clude military, strategic, and civilian targets within Serbia itself, such
as air defense, electrical, communications, and government facilities.
Hewing to the pattern set during previous administrations, presi-
dential initiative in warmaking produced congressional funding sup-
port, but nothing more. On the same day that airstrikes began, the
House of Representatives passed a resolution by 424 to one that de-
clared its support for American troops, but refused to authorize the
use of force.8 On March 26, President Clinton sent a message to the
President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House in-
forming them of the American airstrikes against Serb forces.2 Recit-
ing Serbian atrocities against the Albanian Kosovars, he claimed that
the Milosevic regime had violated both the U.N. charter, U.N. Security
Council resolutions, and NATO resolutions. The President justified
his unilateral decision to use American forces to attack another sover-
eign nation on his "constitutional authority to conduct U.S. foreign
relations and as commander-in-chief and Chief Executive.""0 While he
See Campbell, 52 F. Supp. 2d at 37.
26 See Address to the Nation on Airstrikes Against Serbian Targets in the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), 35 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 516,
517 (Mar. 24, 1999).
27 Id.
28 See H.R. Res. 130, 106th Cong. (1999) (supporting the American troops in the
Balkans despite the "deep reservations" of some members of the House). After recog-
nizing that President Clinton had sent American armed forces to operate against Ser-
bia, the resolution merely declared that "the House of Representatives supports the
members of the United States Armed Forces who are engaged in military operations
against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and recognizes their professionalism, dedi-
cation, patriotism, and courage." Id.
See Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on Airstrikes Against Serbian
Targets in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), 35 WEEKLY
CoMip. PREs. Doc. 527, 527-28 (Mar. 26, 1999) [hereinafter Letter to Congressional
Leaders (Mar. 26, 1999)] (explaining the justifications for the military strikes while
fulfilling his duties "consistentwith the War Powers Resolution").
so Id. at 528.
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welcomed Congress's demonstrations of support, President Clinton
made clear that he did not need its authorization. 3  Following the ex-
amples of Presidents Reagan and Bush, 2 President Clinton described
the report as "consistent" with, rather than "pursuant to," the WPR,
demonstrating a refusal either to recognize the WPR's constitutional-
ity or to comply with its terms. 3 In a follow-up letter on April 7, Presi-
dent Clinton refused to set an end date for American intervention
and instead predicted that military operations would intensify until
Milosevic ended his offensive against the Albanian Kosovars, stopped
the repression, and agreed to a peace accord.3
As the war continued throughout April and May, Congress con-
sidered a series of proposals that bore on war powers. On April 28,
the House of Representatives first rejected, by a vote of 427 to two, a
joint resolution declaring war upon the Federal Republic of Yugosla-
via.35 It then rejected, by a tie 213 to 213 vote, the March 23 Senate
resolution authorizing the use of force. 6 The House also defeated, by
a 290 to 139 vote, a concurrent resolution that would have required
the President to remove all American troops from Yugoslavia opera-
tions. The House then passed a bill that barred the use of any funds
for the deployment of American forces in Yugoslavia without specific
congressional authorization,s8 which the Senate did not consider. On
May 20, Congress doubled the Administration's request for emer-
gency funding for Yugoslavia war operations, to the tune of $11.8 bil-
lion, but did not authorize the war.39 On May 25, President Clinton
reported to Congress that he had deployed even more aircraft and
combat ground troops to the region to support deep strike operations
S1 See id.
32 SeeYoo, Original Understandin& supra note 10, at 181-82.
33 Letter to Congressional Leaders (Mar. 26, 1999), supra note 29, at 528.
34 See Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on Airstrikes Against Serbian
Targets in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), 35 WEEKLY
CoMPI. PRES. Doc. 602, 603 (Apr. 7, 1999). In addition to airstrikes, the President noti-
fied Congress that he had sent combat ground forces to Albania and Macedonia, os-
tensibly to engage in humanitarian relief operations. See id.
36 SeeH.R.J. Res. 44, 106th Cong. (1999).
37 See S. Con. Res. 21, 106th Cong. (1999).
38 SeeH.R. Con. Res. 82, 106th Cong. (1999).
39 SeeH.R. 1569, 106th Cong. (1999).
See 1999 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 106-31, tit.
11, ch. 3, 113 Stat. 57 (1999) (appropriating funding for operations "conducted
against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) during the period
beginning on March 24, 1999, and ending on such date as NATO may designate, to
resolve the conflict with respect to Kosovo").
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in the Yugoslavia theater of operations.40
Conclusion of the Kosovo conflict highlighted the WPR's impo-
tence in constraining presidential decision making. Bombing attacks
against Serbian targets both in Kosovo and in Serbia proper did not
end untilJune 10, 1999, seventy-nine days after the war first began and
nineteen days after the Resolution's sixty day clock had ended.4 1 As
part of the peace terms accepted by Serbia, NATO sent 50,000 troops,
7000 of them American, into Kosovo to maintain peace and security
during the transition to Kosovar self-government.4 Although an
American, General Wesley Clark, directed the bombing campaign,
American troops in the peacekeeping force served under both Ameri-
can and non-American NATO commanders, who themselves were un-
der the command of a British general.43 Congress has refused to give
statutory authorization for the insertion of American troops, who, by
May 2000, had been deployed to the region for almost a full year.
Congress, however, agreed to provide supplementary appropriations
for a long-term military presence in Kosovo. In other words, Congress
could have stopped the war, if it had possessed the political will to do
so, merely by refusing to appropriate the funds to keep the military op-
erations going.
As they consistently have throughout the postwar period, the fed-
eral courts refused to adjudicate the constitutionality of the Presi-
dent's unilateral use of force or his violation of the WPR's terms. Dur-
ing the Kosovo bombing campaign, twenty-six House members sued
President Clinton on the ground that he had usurped Congress's
power to declare war and infringed the WPR by conducting airstrikes
without congressional authorization. 44 Dismissing the action, the Dis-
trict Court for the District of Columbia found that the legislators did
not have Article III standing to challenge the President's action be-
cause Congress, as a whole, had not acted to terminate the interven-
40 See Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on Airstrikes Against the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), 35 WEEKLY Comp. PREs. Doc. 989,
989 (May 25, 1999).
41 See Address to the Nation on the Military Technical Agreement on Kosovo, 35
WEEKLYCoMp. PREs. Doc. 1074, 1074 (June 10, 1999).
42 See Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting the Deployment of United States
Military Personnel as Part of the Kosovo International Security Force, 35 WEEKLY
CouP. PREs. DOC. 1107, 1108 (June 12, 1999).
43 See i. at 1107 (identifying Lieutenant General Sir MichaelJackson as the NATO
commander of the international security presence in Kosovo).
See Campbell v. Clinton, 52 F. Supp. 2d 34, 39 (D.D.C. 1999).
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ton.45 Campbell v. Clinton followed in the wake of earlier decisions of
the D.C. District Court, including two opinions rendered during the
Persian Gulf War, that had found similar challenges nonjusticiable.. 
46
Judicial reluctance to enter the fray is in keeping with historical prac-
tice, as the Supreme Court has never agreed to reach the merits of any.... 47
challenge to presidential warmaking authority abroad.
Kosovo may represent a significant theoretical shift-one that the
Clinton administration has accelerated if not set in motion-in the
nature of the American way of war. During the Reagan and Bush ad-
ministrations, the United States often intervened unilaterally, quickly,
and generally in pursuit of purely American interests. American inva-
sions in Grenada and Panama, for example, occurred without any sig-
nificant multilateral participation, were executed within the sixty-day
War Powers Resolution period, and did not receive Security Council
approval.48
While still significantly American in force structure, military or-
ganization, and political leadership, intervention during the Clinton
years has been anything but unilateral. In Bosnia and Kosovo, Ameri-
can forces participated as part of an international military structure,
sometimes under foreign command. Military operations are no
longer short. Deployments in Haiti and Bosnia have proceeded for
years, rather than weeks. American troops will most likely be sta-
tioned in Kosovo for months, if not years.
The goals of war have changed as well. During the Cold War, the
United States engaged primarily in military conflicts between nation-
states, where the goal was both military and political victory. Under
President Clinton, however, the nation has become involved more of-
See id. at 43 (noting that the "plaintiffs lack standing... [because the injury] is
not sufficiently concrete and particularized").
See, e.g., Dellums v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 1141, 1149-52 (D.D.C. 1990) (holding a
challenge by Congressmen to deployment in Persian Gulf War unripe); Ange v. Bush,
752 F. Supp. 509, 511-15 (D.D.C. 1990) (holding a challenge by National Guard ser-
geant to raise a nonjusticiable political question).
47 Of course, the Court has addressed the question of how far the commander-in-
chief power extends domestically. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343
U.S. 579, 585-88 (1952) (holding that the President's constitutional powers do not ex-
tend to issuing seizure orders for private business property). Youngstown, however, did
not review President Truman's authority to initiate and wage the Korean War without
formal congressional authorization.
48 See generally MAX HILAIRE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE U.S. MMITARY
INTERvENTION IN THE WESTERN HEisHERE (1997); Abraham D. Sofaer, The Legality of
the United States Action in Panama, 29 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 281 (1991); Abraham D.
Sofaer, Book Review, 92 AM.J. INT'L L. 586 (1998).
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ten in "low-intensity conflicts," in which civilian leaders employ mili-
tary force for more diffuse objectives, such as rebuilding nations, en-
forcing international peace or the status quo, and imposing costs on
hostile regimes.49 These objectives fall short of total military and po-
litical victory.
Further, it seems that the modem practice of warmaking has freed
itself from the partisanship that afflicted earlier struggles over foreign
policy. Before the Clinton administration, war power disputes in-
variably assumed party lines, with Republicans defending executive
power and Democrats asserting that all hostilities required legislative
authorization. Republicans controlled the executive branch for all
but four of the twenty-four years between the presidencies of Johnson
and Clinton, while Democrats controlled the majority of the House
for that entire period. After President Clinton's two victories in 1992
and 1996, however, Democrats in Congress have lost their fire on the
war powers issue. It is astonishing how Democratic congressmen who
vociferously attacked aid to El Salvador, escorting oil tankers in the
Persian Gulf, or the Grenada, Panama, and Persian Gulf Wars have
been so obviously inconsistent toward the Clinton administration.
Other Democrats in the executive branch defend presidential war
powers with all of the fervor of their Republican predecessors."0 The
only governmental critics of the modem system of war powers-and
they seem to be a relatively small group-are Republican congress-
men who began service after the 1994 elections, and thus are not
bound by earlier statements on war powers under Republican presi-
dents. Practice under the Clinton administration seems to have estab-
lished, for the first time since Vietnam, true bipartisan precedents in
both Congress and the Presidency in favor of a flexible system of war
powers characterized by executive initiative and legislative funding
approval.
The Clinton administration, however, has given this practice a
new, and potentially significant, twist. Under the Clinton approach,
the approval of the U.N. or other international organizations has
formed the basis for justifying intervention. When sending troops to
Haiti and Bosnia, for example, President Clinton expressly relied
upon the need to carry out U.N. Security Council resolutions as sup-
49 See generally Mark T. Uyeda, Presidential Prerogative Under the Constitution To Deploy
U.S. Military Forces in Low-Intensity Conflic4 44 DUKE L.J. 777, 779-89 (1995) (defining
low-intensity conflicts and commenting on their emergence in the modem era).
50 See, e.g., Walter Dellinger, After the Cold War Presidential Power and the Use of Mili-
taiy Force, 50 U. MIAm L. REv. 107, 109-10 (1995).
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port, rather than upon domestic legal mandates.51 Although he could
not rely upon the Security Council for approval of the Kosovo bomb-
ings, President Clinton still justified the intervention by appealing to
our NATO obligations.52 As he declared when announcing the bomb-
ing campaign, "America has a responsibility to stand with our allies
when they are trying to save innocent lives and preserve peace, free-
dom, and stability in Europe."5'
The Clinton administration has yet to explain fully the legal sig-
nificance of international authorization. While the Clinton admini-
stration's refusal to seek affirmative congressional authorization may
have been consisterit with historical practice, it is still open to constitu-
tional question. For future American participation in multilateral in-
tervention to rest on a firm footing, the American legal system first
must determine whether President Clinton's decision to use force in
Kosovo is consistent with the Constitution.
II. Kosovo AND THE CONSTITUTIONALALLOCATION
OF WAR POWERS
To date, the Clinton administration has failed to provide ajustifi-
cation, under either constitutional or international law, for the war in
Kosovo. This Part seeks to correct this omission. First, it examines the
reasons why most academics, if they were to be consistent, would con-
clude that Kosovo was an unconstitutional war. It then critiques these
theories for incorrectly interpreting the constitutional text, structure,
and history. It concludes by discussing the justifications for the consti-
tutionality of the President's use of force in the Balkans.
Surprisingly, legal academics fell silent during the Kosovo inter-
vention. As far as I can tell, no leading scholar in the fields of consti-
tutional law, foreign relations law, or international law publicly ques-
tioned, in opinion pieces or law review articles, the constitutionality of
the Kosovo conflict. This absence of criticism is puzzling, even em-
barrassingly inconsistent, because it is hard to see how the American
51 See, e.g., Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on the Deployment of
United States Aircraft to Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1995 PUB. PAPERS 1279, 1280 (Sept. 1,
1995) (Bosnia); The President's News Conference, 1994 PUB. PAPERS 1417, 1419 (Aug.
3, 1994) (relying upon U.N. resolutions to justify operations in Haiti); Remarks and
Exchange with Reporters on Bosnia, 1994 PUB. PAPERS 186, 186 (Feb. 6, 1994) (Bos-
nia).
52 See Address to the Nation, supra note 26, at 517 ("Our mission is... to demon-
strate the seriousness of NATO's purpose .... ").
53 Id. at 518.
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use of force in Kosovo was different, in any meaningful way, from pre-
vious military conflicts. During earlier interventions, law professors
were anything but shy in voicing their opinions on the constitutional-
ity of presidential warmaking. Shortly before the Persian Gulf War
began, for example, a group of eleven prominent constitutional and
international law professors filed an amicus brief in a federal district
court that argued that the conflict would violate the Constitution if it
did not receive affirmative congressional authorization.5
Law professors initially did not limit themselves only to Republi-
can presidents. Before the intervention in Haiti, the same professors
who had filed the amicus brief in the Gulf War sent a public letter to
Walter Dellinger, assistant attorney general for the Office of Legal
Counsel, chastising him should he justify the intervention.5 Even
though the U.N. Security Council had issued a resolution authorizing
a Haiti operation, these professors declared that "[i]n our judgment,
that resolution does not absolve Congress of its constitutional obliga-
tion to approve military action or the President of his constitutional
obligation to seek and obtain that approval."6 Since Haiti, however,
these professors have remained silent, even as President Clinton has
unilaterally ordered military interventions with ever greater fre-
quency, especially, and most notably, in the Balkans.
57
In their scholarly works, these foreign relations law scholars
generally agree that unilateral presidential warmaking, without con-
gressional authorization, violates the Constitution. Commentators
such as Louis Fisher, John Hart Ely, Michael Glennon, Louis Henkin,
and Harold Koh have argued that the three branches of government
have failed in their constitutional obligations by allowing this pattern
and practice to continue.-" As they conceive it, the Constitution bars
54 The brief is reprinted in Bruce A. Ackerman et al., Ronald V. Dellums v. George
Bush (D.D.C. 1990): Memorandum Amicus Curiae of Law Professors, 27 STAN. J. INT'L L.
257 (1991).
The professors included Abram Chayes and Laurence Tribe of Harvard, Bruce
Ackerman and Harold Koh of Yale, Philip Kurland of Chicago, Gerald Gunther and
John Hart Ely of Stanford, Lori Fisler Damrosch and Louis Henkin of Columbia, and
William Van Alstyne of Duke. The letter is reprinted in Marian Nash (Leich), Contem-
porary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 96, app.
at 127 (1995). The points made in the letter are further expanded upon in Lori Fisler
Damrosch, The Constitutional Responsibility of Congress for Military Engagements, 89 AM. J.
INT'LL. 58 (1995).
56 Nash (Leich), supra note 55, app. at 127.
57 I suggest explanations for this resounding silence on the part of these scholars
elsewhere in Yoo, Legal Scholars MMA, supra note 2.
58 See, e.g., Louis Fisher, Congressional Abdication: War and Spending Powers, 43 ST.
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the President from initiating offensive wars (but not defensive ones),
unless Congress affirmatively authorizes the use of force. Further,
they argue that federal courts have the duty to enforce this shared al-
location of the war power. These scholars rest their arguments almost
wholly on two interrelated claims. First, they claim, the text of the
Declare War Clause vests Congress with the authority to decide on the
initiation of all forms of military hostilities. Under the Declare War
Clause, Congress has control over formal, total war; the Marque and
Reprisal Clause provides Congress with power over smaller-scale con-
flicts. Second, pro-Congress scholars assert, the Framers intended to
transfer this power from the executive to the legislature because they
believed that a multimember legislature would be less prone to exces-
sive warmaking than a single executive. 9
These scholars leave little room for doubt in their conclusions. As
Professor Ely declares, there is a "clarity of the Constitution on this
question."6° While he admits "the 'original understanding' of the
document's Framers and ratifiers can be obscure to the point of in-
scrutability," he declares that "in this case, .. . it isn't."" On behalf of
the eleven law professors who opposed the Persian Gulf War, Profes-
sor Koh maintains that "the Constitution did not permit the President
to order U.S. armed forces to make war without meaningfully consult-
ing with Congress and receiving its affirmative authorization."62 Un-
der this unbending approach, Kosovo clearly failed constitutional
standards. President Clinton committed 31,000 troops to an air war
that lasted seventy-nine days, well in excess of the limitations of the
War Powers Resolution. He then sent 7000 more troops for a long-
lasting ground deployment in Kosovo itself. Congress neither de-
clared war, nor issued any kind of statutory authorization. Although
Congress provided funding for the war and expressed its support for
LouIs U. LJ. 931, 967-80 (1999) (discussing recent presidential foreign military initia-
tives and congressional disinclination to challenge them); ELY, supra note 1, at 47-67
(outlining the ways Congress can enforce the principles of the WPR or War Clause, but
doubting that Congress will ever employ these methods); GLENNON, supra note 1, at
71-122 (supporting congressional reclamation of the "war power" based on constitu-
tional allocation of authority between the executive and legislative branches); HENKN,
supra note 1, at 17-48 (advocating a reinvigoration of the principles of "dual democ-
racy" to foreign affairs); KOH, supra note 1, at 117-49 (criticizing "congressional acqui-
escence" and "judicial tolerance" of presidential foreign affairs initiatives).
59 See, e.g., ELY, supra note 1, at 140 n.10; Raoul Berger, War-making by the Presiden4
121 U. PA. L. REV. 29, 86-37 (1972).
60 ELY, supra note 1, at5.
61 Id at 3.
62 Harold Hongju Koh, Presidential War and Congressional Consent: The Law Profes-
sors'Memorandum in Dellums v. Bush, 27 STAN.J. INT'L L. 247,249 (1991).
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the troops, critics of presidential warmaking authority have never ac-
cepted such actions as sufficient legislative authorization for military
hostilities.
A. War Powers and the Constitutional Text and Structure
These scholars are mistaken on the Constitution's allocation of
war powers. In my opinion, the constitutional text, structure, and his-
tory indicate that the pro-Congress view errs in demanding a fixed
process for warmaking that places the initiative in the legislature. A
more rigorous attention to the sources indicates that the Framers did
not intend the Constitution to establish a single, correct method for
going to war. Rather, the Constitution vests the political branches
with different powers related to war, which the President and Con-
gress may use to cooperate or, at times, to struggle for control over
foreign policy. Instead of a fixed method, the Constitution's alloca-
tion of warmaking authority yields a flexible system that can change to
meet international challenges. During times of relative peace, Con-
gress can use its authority over funding and the raising of the military
to play a leading role in foreign policy. In times of emergency or na-
tional danger, however, the President can seize the initiative in war-
making. The flexibility of the constitutional framework for warmak-
ing becomes clear when compared to, for example, the Constitution's
finely-wrought procedures for enacting a statute, or, in the area of
foreign affairs, for approving a treaty. If the Framers had intended
the Constitution to impose the strict process demanded by most for-
eign affairs scholars, they would have employed the more detailed
mechanisms and language that they used elsewhere.
Taken in context, the constitutional text, structure, and history
enable the stable system of war powers that the political branches have
worked out over the last half century. Constitutional text, for exam-
ple, does not mandate that Congress approve all uses of force by stat-
ute. Pro-Congress proponents too quickly read the power "To declare
War" to mean the power to initiate all forms of hostilities, and they
read the commander-in-chief and executive power clauses too nar-
rowly to provide only for command over the troops in the field once
war has been authorized. Such an anachronistic approach superim-
poses the modern meaning of declaring war, which we have come to
associate with commencing military hostilities because of World Wars
I and II, upon the eighteenth century text. Further, the constitutional
text provides little support for international legal scholars' odd de-
mand for statutory authorization of warmaking. While their reading
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of the text suggests that Congress must declare war before the nation
can initiate conflict, these academics only require some form of ex
ante legislative authorization, which itself is not a formal declaration
of war. Once these scholars concede that a declaration of war itself is
unnecessary, however, they cannot explain why Congress must provide
its support through authorizing statutes, rather than appropriations,
which provide a real check on the executive's military operations. In-
ternational legal scholars like to claim support from the text, but are
willing to deviate from it only so far as it suits them, and no farther.3
"Declare war" may have the same ring as "commence hostilities" to
the ears of today's international legal scholars, but to eighteenth cen-
tury Americans the phrase would have conveyed a narrower meaning.
Not all forms of hostilities or military deployments rise to the level of a
declared war, which in the Framers' minds would have referred to the
sort of total war more similar to the World Wars than to Kosovo. Dur-
ing the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Great Britain and colo-
nial Americans waged all sorts of conflicts, which sometimes included
direct fighting with the armies and navies of other great powers, with-
out official declarations of war.6 Prominent treatise writers, such as
the influential Blackstone, thought of "war" as only a "completely ef-
fectual" form of hostilities in which the nation would undertake the
military and legal measures to transform the international legal rela-
tionship with the enemy nation from one of peace to one of war.6 It
was clearly understood in the eighteenth century that a declared war
was only the ultimate stage in a gradually ascending scale of hostilities
between nations. Throughout Anglo-American constitutional history,
the power to initiate such hostilities and to control the escalation of
conflict toward war had rested in the hands of the executive. 4 Vesting
Congress with the power to declare war does not indicate an intention
to transfer wholesale to the legislature the power to initiate and con-
trol the level of military hostilities. Thus, the eighteenth century un-
Fisher's companion essay suffers from this problem. He repeatedly refers to ex-
amples where Congress has authorized the President, by statute, to conduct military
operations to support his notion that the Declare War Clause reserves to Congress the
power to initiate hostilities. See, Fisher, Unchecked Presidential Wars, supra note 1, at note
76-96 and accompanying text. Fisher fails to explain, however, why statutory authoriza-
tion can satisfy the demands of the Clause, which would seem to require a congres-
sional declaration of war, while appropriations cannot.
r4 SeeYoo, Original Understanding, supra note 10, at 214-17 (summarizing the prac-
tice of initiating hostilities prior to-or without-a formal declaration of war in the
17th and 18th centuries).
See 1 WILUAM BLAcxsTONE, CoM!mNTAREms *249-50.
See generallyYoo, Original Understanding, supra note 10, at 196-241.
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derstanding of war as referring only to total war provides the grounds
for twenty-first century interpreters to read the phrase narrowly to ex-
clude lower-intensity conflict.
6 7
A holistic examination of the text yields further possibilities.
Other constitutional provisions, for example, suggest that the Framers
did not equate "declare" with "authorize" or "commence." Article I,
Section 10 provides that states, without the consent of Congress, may
not "keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter into any
Agreement or Compact with ... a foreign Power, or engage in War,
unless actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit
of delay."6s In prohibiting the states from becoming involved in war,
the Constitution says that states may not "engage" in war, while Con-
gress alone enjoys the power to "declare" war. If the Framers had in-
tended to vest Congress with a broad warmaking power, aside from
operational command over forces in the field, then we would expect
them to have used the broader "engage" language, rather than the
narrower "declare." And as I will show in Part II.C, the Framers origi-
nally understood a declaration of war to have a specific meaning in
eighteenth century international law, as a means of changing the legal
67 Perhaps recognizing the difficulties in reading "declare" war so broadly, pro-
Congress scholars like Lou Fisher have been shifting their arguments to a rather tor-
tured interpretation of the Marque and Reprisal Clause. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
The Clause gives Congress the power not only to declare war but also the authority to
"grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land
and Water." These letters gave private individuals permission to recover, through mili-
tary action, compensation for injuries suffered at the hands of the citizens of a foreign
nation. Without a letter, such actions would constitute piracy, with one, military ac-
tions became a legitimate form of privateering under international law. SeeYoo, Origi-
nal Understanding supra note 10, at 250-51.
Fisher and others seize on the Clause as referring to "any use of force short of a
declared war." Fisher, Unchecked Presidential Wars, supra note 1, at text preceding note
54; see alsoJules Lobel, Covert War and Congressional Authority: Hidden War and Forgotten
Power, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 1035, 1045 (1986) ("In eighteenth century America, the
term.., came to signify any intermediate or low-intensity hostility short of declared
war."); Stromseth, supra note 1, at 854. These scholars, however, provide no evidence
from the original understanding, nor do they provide any textual or structural reasons,
for reading this technical provision in such a broad manner. While letters of marque
and reprisal referred to one form of low-intensity conflict, these scholars fail to dem-
onstrate that the framers generally understood marque and reprisal to refer to all
forms of conflict short of a declared war. Fisher overlooks a recent work on the Clause
which suggests that letters of marque and reprisal authorized a narrow form of for-
profit commercial warfare, regulated by prize courts, distinct from government-
directed military action aimed at strategic, tactical, or political goals. See C. Kevin Mar-
shall, Comment, Putting Privateers in TheirPlace: The Applicability of theMarque and Repri-
sal Clause to Undeclared Wars, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 953, 974-81 (1997).
68 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
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status between nations from one of peace to one of war, rather than as
a prerequisite for starting hostilities. It would have been odd for the
Framers to have used "declare" so colloquially, as international legal
scholars today would have it, when the phrase bore such a precise
meaning under the international law of the time.
Provisions beyond the Declare War Clause further indicate that if
the Framers had intended to impose a strict, Congress-first, warmak-
ing process, they would have used different language. Again, Article I,
Section 10 proves suggestive. If the Framers had such a goal in mind,
Articles I or II could have included a clause that declared "the Presi-
dent shall not engage the United States in War, without the consent of
Congress." Article II, Section 2 similarly implies that if the Framers
had wanted to require congressional participation in the decision on
war, they knew how to draft the requisite language. Article II, Section
2, Clause 2 declares that the President "shall have Power, by and with
the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two
thirds of the Senators present concur . . . ."" The same Section also
requires senatorial consent in the making of judicial and ambassado-
rial appointments.0 Pro-Congress scholars cannot explain why, if the
Framers had wanted to slow down the process of going to war, they
did not adopt a parallel phrase: the President "shall have Power, by
and with the Advice and Consent of Congress, to make War." Instead,
critics of presidential power require us to believe that the Framers
sought such a goal, but chose to use obtuse, even inept language to do
so. Other textual provisions, however, reinforce the notion that when
the Framers wanted to make legislative participation a constitutional
sine qua non in the exercise of certain executive powers, they knew
how.
Constitutional structure lends support to the idea that the Fram-
ers expected the war power to be shaped by the interaction of the po-
litical branches within flexible constitutional guidelines. Unsurpris-
ingly, the central feature of many of the Constitution's structural
provisions involves the passage of legislation, its subject matter, and its
potential reach. Inability to enact legislation that directly regulated
individuals and private conduct posed perhaps the greatest obstacle to
the success of the Articles of Confederation. Yet, fearful of centralized
government power, the Framers sought to make the passage of legisla-
tion difficult. As a result, the constitutional structure establishes a de-
9 Id. art. II, § 2, cl.2.
70 See id.
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tailed, finely-wrought method for public lawmaking. It allows a num-
ber of players in the system-the House, Senate, President and even
the courts-to block the creation and implementation of legislation.
Compare this to the relevant provisions governing warmaking. We
find no clear, detailed process governing the relevant roles of the po-
litical branches in decisions about war-certainly none that rises to
the same level of specificity and clarity for making statutes or even
treaties. Rather, the Constitution briefly distributes different war-
related powers in both Articles I and II without describing how they
are to interact. The Constitution gives Congress the power only to de-
clare war, not the power to commence hostilities, nor the power to
make war.
Further, warmaking is affected by other grants of power and con-
stitutional structures that do not impact the process of public lawmak-
ing. The institutional center of gravity in the legislative process clearly
rests with Congress, which not only acts as the starting point for legis-
lation, but also as the ending point, given Congress's power to over-
ride a presidential veto. The Constitution vests Congress with "All leg-
islative Powers herein granted."71 Warmaking, by contrast, is the
quintessential executive power. It calls for action, energy, and dis-
patch in execution, rather than for the formulation of rules that gov-
ern the conduct of private individuals. Unlike legislation, where even
the President's veto is granted in Article I, warmaking provisions rest
in both Articles I and II. Unlike Congress's grant of legislative power
in Article I, which is limited to the powers enumerated in Article I,
Section 8 of Article II vests the President with all of an undefined fed-
eral executive power. Aside from any powers not specifically excepted
from the President, such as those in Article II, Section 2 involving
treaties and appointments, Article II's vesting clause reserves all other
executive power to the President.7 Not only does this structure sug-
71 Id. art. I, § 1.
72 This, of course, was the argument most famously made by Alexander Hamilton
in defending President Washington's Neutrality Proclamation. See Pacificus No. 1, June
29, 1793, in 15 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 33, 37-43 (Harold C. Syrett ed.,
1969) ("The general doctrine then of our constitution is, that the EXECUTIVE POWER
of the Nation is vested in the President; subject only to the exceptions and qualifications
which are expressed in the instrument."). For a modem version of the argument, see
Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's Power To Execute the Laws,
104 YALE L.J. 541, 663-64 (1994) (arguing that the President alone is accountable for
executing federal law). Calabresi and Prakash's thesis, like Hamilton's, has not re-
ceived general acceptance. See, e.g., Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105
YALE L.. 1725 (1996); Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Admini-
stration, 94 COLJm. L. REV. 1, 2 (1994) (alleging that the Framers envisioned strong
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gest that the Declare War Clause ought to be read narrowly, it also al-
lows for substantial flexibility in the manner in which the branches
decide to go to war. What the constitutional structure does not do,
however, is provide support for the arguments of pro-Congress schol-
ars who would read the vesting of executive power in the President so
narrowly as to be invisible and the Declare War Clause so broadly as to
encompass most of the war power.
B. The Historical Claims of Pro-Congress Scholars
With the textual foundations of their argument so weak, pro-
Congress scholars place the weight of their claims upon the original
understanding. In particular, they maintain that the Framers con-
sciously intended to change the system that had prevailed in Great
Britain, where the Crown enjoyed all of the war power. According to
these scholars, such as Louis Fisher, the Framers vested Congress with
the power to decide on the use of force because they thought that leg-
islatures-because of their larger numbers-were inherently less
prone to war.7 Scholars like Fisher generally rely upon four pieces of
evidence in reaching this conclusion: Joseph Story's observation that
vesting Congress with the power to declare war would inhibit the abil-
ity of one person to start war;74 a letter from James Madison to Thomas
Jefferson stating that the Constitution "vested the question of war in
the Legisl[ature]"; 75 the decision by the Constitutional Convention to
change Congress's power from "make" war to "declare" war;7 and a
speech by James Wilson during the Pennsylvania ratifying convention
stating that the Constitution's allocation of war powers was designed
to "not hurry us into war.
"77
Fisher's companion piece to this Article demonstrates the meth-
odological problems that undermine the pro-Congress approach. In
congressional power). The debate between Calabresi and Prakash and their critics,
however, revolves around whether the power of "administration" is fully executive in
nature, rather than whetherwarmaking is executive or legislative.
73 See Fisher, Unchecked Presidential Wars, supra note 1, at text accompanying notes
52-53.
74 See 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES § 570, at 410-11 (Ronald D. Rotunda &John E. Nowak eds., Durham, Carolina
Academic Press 1987) (1833).
Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Apr. 2, 1798), in 6 THE
WRrIINGS OFJAMES MADISON 312 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1906).
76 2 THE REcoRDs OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 318-19 (Max Farrand
ed., 1966) (1911).
77 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 583
(MerrillJensen ed., 1976) [hereinafterDOCUMENTARYHISTORY].
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brief, Fisher uses sources in an anachronistic manner that treats
statements as distant as forty-five years after the ratification as if they
expressed the understanding of the Framers who actually had drafted
and adopted the Constitution. For example, while Joseph Story may
have believed that the power to declare war included the power to de-
cide to begin a military conflict, his views could not possibly have in-
fluenced or demonstrated a common understanding by the ratifiers:
Story's book appeared almost a half-century after the ratification-
Story himself was only eight years old during the Philadelphia Conven-
tion.78 Story may have been a prodigy, but he was no Mozart. While
other scholars rely upon Madison's letter to Jefferson, he wrote it in
1798, not 1787, and in private.7
Even if one were to treat the secret proceedings of the Philadel-
phia Convention-which could only propose, not adopt, the Constitu-
tion-as authoritative, its decision to amend Congress's power from
"make" to "declare" war actually cuts against the pro-Congress read-
ing. This change demonstrates that the Framers understood that the
broader power of making war existed, and that they decided explicitly
to take that power away from Congress and replace it with the nar-
rower power of declaring war."0 Attempting to draw any firmer con-
clusions from the brief debate on the Clause, which occupies only one
page out of the Convention's 12 7 3-page record, imposes far too much
order on the confusion that surrounded the Framers' discussion.
Finally, while James Wilson's single statement came during a state
78 See Ronald D. Rotunda &John E. Nowak, Introduction to STORY, supra note 74, at
v-xiv (providing Story's biographical details).79
While those who rely upon Madison's 1794 Helvidius essays are at least four
years closer to the ratification, they often do not make clear the context of the papers,
which renders dubious their usefulness as evidence of the original understanding that
obtained during the ratification. Not only did his remarks come six years after the rati-
fication, but Madison was not trying to represent the Constitution's meaning to those
who were to adopt it. Rather, in these essays, Madison was engaging in a fierce parti-
san debate with Alexander Hamilton over the Neutrality Proclamation and relations
with Europe. Further, Madison does not appear to have been consistent on this point
with his statements during the ratification, see infra text accompanying notes 98-101,
which should make his comments in 1794 even less probative. Those who rely on Jef-
ferson's comments about the war powers clauses suffer from similar methodological
problems. See Fisher, Unchecked Presidential Wars, supra note 1, at text accompanying
note 37; Stromseth, supra note 1, at 852-64 (relying on several of these post-ratification
exchanges between and among the Framers). Jefferson was not even present in the
United States during the Philadelphia Convention or the ratification process.
80 For a fuller discussion of the few pages of debate concerning the Federal Con-
vention's change of the Declare War Clause, see Yoo, Original Understanding supra note
10, at 256-69.
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ratifying convention, it is difficult to generalize his beliefs as repre-
senting the widespread understanding of war powers held by those
who ratified the Constitution. Only one person, Wilson may have
been referring only to the type of formal wars between broad alliances
81that had beset Europe during the eighteenth century. Wilson was
neither clearly equating a declaration of war with the first steps toward
total war, nor addressing low intensity conflict-what eighteenth-
century writers called "imperfect" war.2 Fisher and others seek to but-
tress Wilson's arguments by referring to comments made during the
North and South Carolina ratifying conventions. Reliance upon
these conventions underscores the problems with Fisher's use of his-
tory and his conception of the original understanding. The North
Carolina debates usually cited by pro-Congress scholars took place af-
ter the Constitution had received the necessary nine votes it needed to
take effect. North Carolina did not actually ratify the Constitution un-
til November 21, 1789. To provide some context, this was after the
election of Washington as President, the passage of legislation estab-
lishing the three executive departments of government, the delivery
of the Bill of Rights from Congress to the states, and the passage of
the Judiciary Act of 1789. To make matters worse, in its first state rati-
fying convention in August 1788, which provides the source for pro-
Congress scholars, North Carolina rejected the Constitution by a deci-
sive 184-84 vote.4 North Carolina's refusal to ratify makes it difficult
to treat the explanations of the Constitution offered there as authori-
tative.8 ' While focusing on these questionable sources, Fisher and
others fail to examine records from key turning points in the ratifica-
tion contest, such as the Virginia convention, where the Framers ex-
tensively discussed war powers. These discussions will be examined in
the next section.
81 SeeYoo, Clio, supra note 12, at 1183-85.
82 Id. at 1185.
See Fisher, Unchecked Presidential Wars, supra note 1, at text accompanying note
53.
84 SeeJONATHAN ELLIOT, 4 TE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON
THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL
CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA, IN 1787, at 250-51 (William S. Hein & Co. 1996) (2d
ed. 1891).
We have very sketchy records from the South Carolina convention, which was
considered politically unimportant, unlike those in Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, Vir-
ginia, and New York.
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C. The Original Understanding of WarPowers
Approaching history with a deeper appreciation of the context
surrounding the Constitution's framing produces a very different pic-
ture than the one painted by pro-Congress scholars. In order to re-
construct the allocation of war powers as originally understood by the
Constitution's ratifiers, we must examine the institutional history of
warmaking during the period leading up to the Framing.' Three ele-
ments of the historical context suggest that late-eighteenth-century
Americans would have understood the Constitution to create a flexi-
ble warmaking system, one in which the President had the authority to
initiate hostilities, subject to Congress's power over the purse. First,
American knowledge of the practical workings of the British constitu-
tion indicates that they would not have understood the Declare War
power to have borne the immense significance given to it by pro-
Congress scholars. Rather, British history suggests that the Framers
would have expected the deeper structural relationship between the
executive and legislative branches to govern war. Second, American
experience during the colonial and early national periods indicates
that they sought to continue, rather than consciously disavow, the tra-
ditional Anglo-American system of war powers. Third, statements dur-
ing the ratification process lend strong support to the thesis that the
Framers did not understand the Constitution to represent a sharp
break from the customary institutional allocation of war powers. If
anything, several Federalist leaders believed that the Constitution
would duplicate the basic outlines of the British war powers system,
rather than erase them.
We ought to pay close attention to the British constitutional sys-
tem of the eighteenth century because, as former subjects of the Brit-
ish Empire, the Framers operated within its intellectual, constitu-
tional, and legal context. Not only did the British constitution
provide concepts and phrases, such as "commander-in-chief," "execu-
tive power," and "Declare War," that the Framers imported directly
into their new plan of government, but recent British political history
provided a track record of how the distribution of these powers would
work in practice. A review of this legal and political context indicates
that it is unlikely that a typical Framer would have understood the
power to declare war as equivalent to the domestic authority to initiate
military hostilities.6 Rather, the power to declare war only gave Con-
gress the authority to transform hostilities into a "perfect" war under
86 SeeYoo, Original Understanding, supra note 10, at 196-217.
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international law. In other words, the power to declare war was almost
a judicial one, in which Congress issued its declaration that the legal
state between the United States and another nation had switched
from peace to war. In other respects, the American Constitution left
the allocation of war powers relatively untouched.
Several sources suggest that we ought to read the power to declare
war as granting no more than the authority to define the nation's le-
gal relationships, under international law, with other countries. First,
the international and British legal authorities of the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries, such as Grotius, Vattel, and Blackstone, dis-
cussed a declaration of war as a form of notice, which informed both
enemy nations and one's own citizens that the laws of war were to ap-
ply.87 Once a nation had declared war, both enemy states and neutrals
knew that the nation's actions were now governed by the rules of war;
its citizens and forces legally could undertake hostile acts forbidden in
peacetime. War vested what would normally be lawless private acts
with the sanction of the state. As Blackstone observed, a declaration
of war was necessary
not so much that the enemy may be put upon his guard... but that it
may be certainly clear that the war is not undertaken by private persons,
but by the will of the whole community; whose right of willing is in this
case transferred to the supreme magistrate by the fundamental laws of
society.88
None of the important legal writers of the period believed that a dec-
laration of war was necessary for domestic constitutional purposes, in
the manner claimed by critics of executive warmaking.
Second, practice under the British constitution indicates that the
British did not believe a declaration of war to be an indispensable
precursor to military hostilities. In the two most significant military
conflicts of the two centuries before the Revolution, Britain's entry
into the Thirty Years' War in 1624 and the Seven Years' War against
France from 1756-1763, the Crown did not declare war until at least a
year had passed after the start of military hostilities. 9 In the period
87 See, e.g., BiAcKSTONE, supra note 65, at *250; 2 HuGO GROTIUs, DEJURE BET
AC PAcis LIBRI TRES [THREE BooKs ABOUT THEI LAW OF WAR AND PEACE] 633 (Francis
W. Kelsey trans., 1925) (1646); EMMERICH DE VATFEL, 3 LE DROrr DES GENs, ou
PRINCIPES DE LA Loi NATURELLE, APPLIQUES A LA CONDU1TE ET AUX AFFAIRES DES
NATIONS ET DES SOUVERAINS [THE LAWS OF NATIONS OR THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL
LAW, APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND TO THE AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND OF SOVEREIGNS
255 (Charles G. Fenwick trans., Carnegie Institution of Washington 1916) (1758).
BLACKSTONE, supra note 65, at *258.
89 SeeYoo, Original Understanding, supra note 10, at 214-17.
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between the Restoration and the American Revolution, Great Britain
engaged in eight significant conflicts, but declared war before or at
the start of hostilities only once.Y Rather than domestic authorization
for military operations, these declarations served their main purpose
in international law by listing grievances against the other nation, de-
manding a remedy, and defining the war's international legal status.
Indeed, the conflict that would have been freshest in the Framers'
minds, the Seven Years' War, is particularly instructive. As early as July
1754, American colonials had joined British troops in attacking
French positions in North America, leading to the British defeat in
which George Washington first distinguished himself. The King
would not declare war until May 1756.92 As Alexander Hamilton ob-
served during the ratification, "the ceremony of a formal denuncia-
tion of war has of late fallen into disuse."93 It seems evident from Brit-
ish political history that the British and Americans of the framing
generation would not have considered the power to declare war as en-
compassing the very different power, under domestic constitutional
law, that pro-Congress scholars attribute to it.
Eighteenth-century Americans would not have considered a trans-
fer of the declare war power to be a monumental shift in the balance
of powers because the basic principles of Anglo-American constitu-
90 These were: the Second Anglo-Dutch War (1665-1667), the Third Anglo-Dutch
War (1672-1674), the War of the Grand Alliance (1689-1697), the War of the Spanish
Succession (1702-1713), the War of the Quadruple Alliance (1718-1720), the War of
the Austrian Succession (1739-1748), the Seven Years' War (1756-1763), and the
American Revolution (1775-1783). See generally JEREMY BLACK, A SYSTEM OF
AMBITION?: BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY 1660-1793 (1991). England declared war before
hostilities only in 1689, at the start of the War of the Grand Alliance. This period also
included numerous minor conflicts in which no declaration of war was issued. See id
at 214 n.252;J.F. MAURICE, HOSTILITIES WrHOUT DECLARATION OF WAR 12-79 (Lon-
don, Her Majesty's Stationery Office 1883) (detailing 107 instances of hostilities with-
out a declaration of war between 1700-1798).
9] See BLACK, supra note 89, at 214-15.
92 See, e.g., DOUGLAS EDWARD LEACH, ARMS FOR EMPIRE: A MILITARY HISTORY OF
THE BRITISH COLONIES IN NORTH AMERICA, 1607-1763, at 210, 340-41, 380-81 (1973)
(describing military activities in 1754 and the declaration of war in 1756).
93 THE FEDERALIST No. 25, at 165 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961). Publius was defending the Constitution's authorization of the maintenance of
standing armies in peacetime because of the dangers of a surprise attack without a
formal declaration of war. Id ("The steady operations of war against a regular and dis-
ciplined army, can only be successfully conducted by a force of the same kind.").
Other Federalists and Anti-Federalists shared Hamilton'sjudgment. See Brutus X N.Y.
J. (Jan. 24, 1787), reprinted in 15 DOCUMENTARYHIsTORY, supra note 77, at 462-67; Mar-
cus, IV NORFOLK & PORTSMOUTH J. (Mar. 12, 1788), reprinted in 16 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 77, at 379-86.
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tionalism already recognized the legislature's ample authority to
check executive warmaking. Years of political strife under the Stuarts,
the Civil War, and the Glorious Revolution had made clear that the
Crown could conduct no military operations without Parliament's po-
litical and financial cooperation. 4 Parliament's check, however, did
not take the form of authorizing legislation. Rather, it exercised ple-
nary control over the funding of the military and its wartime opera-
tions. British history during the period leading up to the Revolution
indicates that Parliament was able to use its power of the purse to win
a functional veto over decisions of war and peace.95 As one historian
has described it, Parliament's creation of, and control over, the finan-
cial system became "the sinews of power" that made possible Eng-
land's military and political rise in the eighteenth century.96 An
American legislature would not need the power to declare war to con-
tain the executive's military initiatives because the lessons of British
constitutional history taught that the power of the purse would give
Congress sufficient control.
97
American experience under the colonial and early national char-
ters buttressed the understandings generated by the British system.
Under the colonial charters, royal governors exercised formal author-
ity over the commencement of military hostilities, subject to the as-
semblies' plenary control over appropriations." When they rebelled,
the revolutionaries could have transferred warmaking authority from
their executives to their legislatures. They did not. Retaining the
general allocation of war powers, the drafters of the revolutionary
SeeYoo, Original Understanding supra note 10, at 209-14.
95 See id. at 208-14.
96 See generally JOHN BREWER, ThE SINEMS OF POWER WAR, MONEY AND THE
ENGLISH STATE, 1688-1783 (1989).
97 In this regard, Fisher, like other pro-Congress scholars, exaggerates the British
monarch's war powers in order to make the Constitution's transfer of powers to Con-
gress all the more intentional. If the Framers, Fisher argues, had intended to maintain
the King's executive war powers in the President, they would have given the executive
the powers to declare war, to issue letters of marque and reprisal, to raise armies, and
to regulate the military. See Fisher, Unchecked Presidential Wars, supra note 1, at text ac-
companying note 57. Fisher, however, mistakenly believes that the King possessed all
of these powers at the time of the framing. By the turn of the seventeenth century, for
example, the Crown had lost the power to raise armies without statutory authorization
and Parliament had assumed the power to regulate the military in addition to its sole
control over funding of the military. SeeYoo, Original Understanding; supra note 10, at
213. The Constitution's sole alteration in the British allocation of war powers was to
transfer to the legislature those powers involving the declaration of a nation's status
and relationship with other nations under international law.
98 SeeYoo, Original Understanding supra note 10, at 219-21.
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state constitutions instead experimented with the fragmentation of
the executive's institutional unity." When these efforts proved cha-
otic, some states adopted constitutions-widely admired by those who
would lead the ratification fight-that re-centralized power in a single
executive. 100 As historian Gordon Wood has told the story, American
leaders sought to temper the tyranny of the majority by restoring the
powers of the executive branch and resurrecting its unity and inde-
pendence.' That recent political history set the backdrop for the
Framers' understanding of the Constitution.
Two specific points about the early national period are worth not-
ing. First, the Articles of Confederation, drafted in 1777 and ratified
in 1781, provided the Continental Congress with "the sole and exclu-
sive right and power of determining on peace and war."' The use of
this phrase shows that the Framers knew how to vest the power to ini-
tiate war when they wanted to, and that they understood that the
power to declare war was a narrow subset of the larger power to de-
cide on and make war. Some have argued that the Articles' vesting of
the war power in Congress demonstrates a re-conception of war as a
legislative function. 4 This conclusion errs in mistaking the Continen-
tal Congress for a legislature. As historians have recognized, the Con-
tinental Congress served primarily as an executive body, which as-
See id. at 221-28.
00 See id. at 228-34.
101 See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787,
at 446-53 (1969); see also CHARLES C. THACHJR., THE CREATION OF THE PRESIDENCY,
1775-1789: A STUDY IN CONSTfTUTIONAL HISTORY 34-35 (1922).
102 An effort to relocate war powers from the executive to the legislature would
have been surprising, for as Professor William Treanor has put it, "[f]or [the Framers]
to believe that such a decision was appropriate, there would have had to have been
some concern causing them to turn against the great tide of constitutional history."
Treanor, supra note 1, at 721; see alsoJohn C.Yoo, Treaties and Public Lawmaking. A Tex-
tual and Structural Defense of Non-Self-Execution, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 2218, 2224 (1999)
[hereinafter Yoo, Treaties and Lawmaking]. Treanor believes, however, that the Fram-
ers' fear of fame-seeking provides sufficient ground to conclude that the Framers did
attempt to act counter-cyclically on the issue of war powers. I have argued elsewhere
that Treanor's level of analysis is far too general to support any concrete conclusions
about the original understanding of war powers. SeeYoo, Clio, supra note 12, at 1212.
103 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IX (1777).
104 See FISHER, supra note 1, at 6 (arguing that the Constitution intentionally made
the war powers a legislative power in contrast to England); Berger, supra note 59, at 33
(noting that the Articles dispensed with the executive); Arthur Bestor, Separation of
Powers in the Domain of Foreign Affairs: The Original Intent of the Constitution Historically
Examined 5 SETON HALL L. REv. 527, 567-68 (1974) (noting that the Articles required
two-thirds of the states to approve foreign affairs, especially those relating to military
actions, in order to ensure legislative deliberation).
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sumed the functions that were formerly the responsibility of the
Crown. 05 In fact, the Continental Congress lacked those powers-
such as the power to directly regulate individual conduct-that we nor-
mally associate with a legislature. Vesting the war power in the Conti-
nental Congress indicates that, throughout the early national period,
the Framers continued to view warmaking as primarily an executive
function.
Second, the state constitutions, as the next most important public
law documents of their day, provide another significant context
against which to evaluate the Framers' work. While almost all of the
revolutionary state constitutions maintained the traditional allocation
of war powers between executive initiative and legislative control over
finances, one state, South Carolina, took a different path. In its 1778
Constitution, South Carolina declared that "the governor and com-
mander-in-chief shall have no power to commence war, or conclude
peace, or enter into any final treaty" without legislative approval1ee If
the Framers held a common understanding that war powers had be-
come legislative in function, then South Carolina's declaration would
have been unnecessary. If "declare" commonly meant "initiate" or
"commence," as pro-Congress scholars suggest, we would not have ex-
pected South Carolina to use "commence." Most importantly, if the
Framers had intended to adopt a legislature-dominated system of war
powers, they simply would have followed South Carolina's example.
Instead, the South Carolina Constitution suggests that the Framers did
not choose to transfer the initiative in warmaking from the executive
to Congress.
One final source of historical context that should guide the inter-
pretation of war powers is the constitutional ratification process. To
105 See JERRILYN GREENE MARSTON, KING AND CONGRESS: THE TRANSFER OF
POLITICAL LEGITIMACY, 1774-76, at 303 (1987) (arguing that the Congress was the ad-
ministrative and executive successor to the King); Eugene R. Sheridan &John M. Mur-
rin, Introduction to CONGRESS AT PRINCETON: BEING THE LETTERS OF CHARLES
THOMSON TO HANNAH THOMSON, JUNE-OCTOBER 1783, at xxxiv-xxxviii (Eugene R.
Sheridan &John M. Murrin eds., 1985) (explaining that Congress took "the powers of
the imperial crown" in 1775-1776).
106 S.C. CoNsT. of 1778, art. XXXII, repinted in 6 TIE FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAwS 3255 (Frances
Newton Thorpe ed., 1909). In its temporary 1776 Constitution, South Carolina also
included a provision that required the governor to receive the consent of both the
state assembly and the council before making war or peace. See S.C. CONST. of 1776,
art. XXVI, reprinted in 6 id. at 3247 ("That the president and commander-in-chief shall
have no power to make war or peace, or enter into any final treaty, without the consent
of the general assembly and legislative council.").
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be sure, the subject of war powers did not consume the attention of
the Framers as did, for example, questions of federalism. While this
Article is not the place to conduct an extensive review of the ratifica-
tion Virginia's ratifying convention ought to receive close attention.
As home to many of the political leaders of the day, Virginia was per-
haps the veto gate through which the Constitution had to pass in order
for the new nation to survive. 8 Led by the fiery oratory of Patrick
Henry, Anti-Federalists in the state attacked the Constitution for cen-
tralizing military powers of a dictatorial nature in the President. "If
your American chief, be a man of ambition, and abilities, how easy is it
for him to render himself absolute!" Henry exclaimed.1' 9 "The army is
in his hands, and, if he be a man of address, it will be attached to him;
and it will be the subject of long meditation with him to seize the first
auspicious moment to accomplish his design ... ,110 In response,
Federalists relied upon the separation of powers and the legislature's
control over war finances, not the Declare War Clause. Leading the
ratification fight in Virginia, for example, Madison predicted that
Congress would enjoy the same powers over warmaking as did Parlia-
ment: "The sword is in the hands of the British King. The purse is in
the hands of the Parliament. It is so in America, as far as any analogy
can exist."" Federalists had every incentive to raise the Declare War
Clause as an important check on the executive's powers, but they did
not. Instead, they argued, as did Madison, that "[t]he purse is in the
hands of the Representatives of the people. They have the appropria-
tion of all monies. They have the direction and regulation of land
and naval forces. They are to provide for calling forth the mili-
tia ....,1 2 Meanwhile, "the President is to have the command; and, in
conjunction with the Senate, to appoint the officers." u3 Other leading
Federalists echoed Madison's reliance upon the legislature's tradi-
tional funding powers as the primary check on the President's initia-
107 I have undertaken that task in Yoo, Original Understanding, supra note 10, at 241-
86. 8 See McNollgast, Positive Canons: The Role of Legislative Bargains in Statutoy Inter-
pretation, 80 GEO. L.J. 705, 707 (1992) (discussing the concept of veto gates).
109Patrick Henry, The Virginia Convention Debates (June 5, 1788), in 9
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 77, at 964.
110 id-
111James Madison, The Virginia Convention Debates (June 14, 1788), in 10
DOCUMENTARYISTORY, supra note 77, at 1282.
112 1
113 Id
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tive in matters of war.
1 4
A more careful examination of the relevant historical context,
therefore, shows that the Framers did not understand the proposed
Constitution to demand anything like the massive transfer of warmak-
ing authority claimed by pro-Congress scholars. Instead, the ratifiers
of the Constitution adhered to the traditional Anglo-American ap-
proach to the distribution of war powers, in which the legislature used
its sole control over funding to check and balance the executive's
authorities over military affairs. Rather than a strict procedure for go-
ing to war, the Constitution's text and its original understanding es-
tablish a system in which the branches pursue their policies concern-
ing war by relying on their plenary constitutional powers. If the two
branches agree on foreign policy goals, the Constitution allows for ef-
fective and swift cooperation. If the branches are in conflict, they can
use their powers to stymie and check each other until a political con-
sensus is reached. Instead of a realm of finely-tuned processes gov-
erned by rules and judicial review, the exercise of war powers has de-
veloped in the realm of politics within the broad constitutional
bounds established by the Framers." 5
14 See, e.g., George Nicholas, The Virginia Convention Debates (June 14, 1788), in
10 DOCUMENTARYHSTORY, supra note 77, at 1281.
11 Fisher attempts to counter the weight of this evidence by arguing that the Con-
stitution establishes a sharp distinction between offensive and defensive war. See
Fisher, Unchecked Presidential Wars, supra note 1, at text accompanying notes 115-21. We
agree that, at a minimum, the Declare War Clause reserves to Congress the power to
place the United States in a state of total war under international law. We part ways,
however, when Fisher reads the Declare War Clause to preclude the President from
waging any type of offensive military operations and to limit executive warmaking
authority solely to cases in which the United States or its forces are attacked. Fisher
provides no reason why we must understand "war" to mean "all offensive uses of force."
Fisher is imposing a modem notion of offensive/defensive war upon the different un-
derstandings of the ftaming generation. While some mentioned the idea during the
confused Philadelphia Convention debate, none of the prominent actors in the ratifi-
cation made this distinction in discussing war powers. This is telling, given that the
Federalists had every reason to make any arguments that they could to downplay the
scope of presidential powers.
Much of Fisher's evidence falls short in demonstrating the understanding held by
the Framers when they ratified the Constitution. In determining the original under-
standing of the meaning of "war," the observations of the Supreme Court almost 80
years after the ratification, see id. at notes 116-18 and accompanying text, do not seem
relevant. Even the holdings of the Marshall Court or of lower federal courts in the
early nineteenth century, cited by Fisher, do not provide support for his reading.
None of these cases raised directly the question of which branch had the authority to
initiate offensive military hostilities, nor can they be taken as signs of the original un-
derstanding, as they came after the Constitution was ratified.
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D. The Original Understanding Modern Conflict, and
the War Powers Resolution
Under the flexible model of war powers outlined in this Article,
President Clinton's decision to commit American forces to hostilities
in Kosovo met constitutional requirements. As the Constitution
makes the President the commander-in-chief, and as military forces
were funded and authorized without any congressional prohibition as
to their use, President Clinton had full constitutional authority to ini-
tiate military hostilities in the Balkans. Further, Congress had an ade-
quate opportunity to use its plenary power over funding to review the
merits of the war. Congress voted to authorize the supplemental ap-
propriations necessary to conduct military operations in Kosovo, and
in that context it debated the merits of the war itself. If Congress had
disagreed with the intervention, all it had to do was do nothing. The
federal courts properly stayed out of the matter, as they have neither
competence nor any call to intercede, as both branches have more
than sufficient powers at their disposal to defend their prerogatives. 6
President Clinton did not wage war by secretly diverting funds appro-
priated to one purpose and shifting them to the war, nor did he defy
anyjudicial orders or even any Kosovo-related legislation.
One might respond that it is unreasonable to expect Congress to
use its appropriations powers to cut off troops in the field. Surely
members of Congress will not take actions that might be interpreted
as undermining the safety and effectiveness of the military, once
committed and in the midst of hostilities. We should not, however,
mistake a failure of political will for a violation of the Constitution.
Congress undoubtedly possessed the power to end the Kosovo war; it
simply chose not to use it. Affirmatively providing funding for a war,
or at the very least refusing to cut off previous appropriations, repre-
sents a political determination by Congress that it will provide mini-
mal support for a war, but that ultimately it will leave it to the Presi-
dent to receive the credit either for success or failure. Congress can
use its constitutional powers over appropriations and the legal aspects
of hostilities to severely constrain executive warmaking or to leverage
a greater political role for itself, just as it has in many domestic areas
of regulation. Not wanting to appear to have failed to support the
troops is a decision of political, not constitutional, significance. Re-
11 SeeJESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REvIEw AND TBE NATIONAL POITICAL PROCESS:
A FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT 260-379
(1980).
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cent wars show only that Congress has refused to exercise the ample
powers at its disposal, not that there has been an alarming breakdown
in the constitutional structure.
The flexible system of warmaking suggests that Congress's power
over funding, rather than broad framework statutes like the War Pow-
ers Resolution, provides the legislature with the right to participate in
the decision to initiate hostilities. Indeed, the original understanding
indicates that the War Powers Resolution is unconstitutional because
it attempts to enact general rules limiting the President's commander-
in-chief and executive powers to engage in hostilities that do not rise
to the level of total war. When constitutional critics complained that
the President might exercise such a power recklessly, Federalists such
as Madison did not respond by asserting that Congress could pass a
statute, or use its Declare War authority, to check the executive.
Rather, they responded that Congress would use its appropriations
power to frustrate presidential warmaking that was not in the nation's
interest. 117 The War Powers Resolution's inconsistency with the Con-
stitution's text, history, and original understanding explains, perhaps,
why none of the branches, including Congress itself, has respected or
enforced its terms. Attempting to place a statutory straighjacket on
war powers undermines the very flexibility-swift and decisive presi-
dential action combined with congressional participation via the fund-
ing power-that the Framers understood the Constitution to establish.
Indeed, the conclusion that Congress has given some blanket
form of approval for wars such as Kosovo, despite the dormancy of the
Declare War Clause, seems almost inescapable. Even after the end of
the Cold War, Congress continues to authorize standing armed forces
capable of conducting large-scale military operations around the
world. It funds weapons systems that allow the United States to en-
gage in a wide variety of interventions, from quick, surgical cruise mis-
sile strikes to power projection by carrier groups to invasions by heavy
armored forces. By providing long-term funding for a permanent
military capable of such operations, Congress has given the executive
the means to send the troops immediately into combat overseas. By
not taking the step of placing conditions on their use, as is often done
with domestic spending programs, Congress has given implicit ap-
proval for their deployment. Indeed, by keeping the funds flowing
once hostilities in Kosovo had begun, Congress ratified the executive's
exercise of initiative in war. The decision to go to war in Kosovo op-
117 See supra text accompanying notes 111-14.
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crated well within the boundaries set by the constitutional text and
the original understanding of war powers.
III. MULTILATERALISM AND THE CONSTITUTIONALFUTURE
The debate over the constitutionality of military operations in
Kosovo is as old as the Constitution itself. The American political sys-
tem has struggled with the question of executive war powers ever since
Alexander Hamilton and James Madison squared off in the Pacificus-
Helvidius debates. This Article has demonstrated that the original
understanding of the Constitution permits war powers to be exercised
as they have over the last two centuries. Kosovo, however, provokes
questions that go beyond the usual struggle between the executive
and the legislature in managing war. Kosovo involves perhaps the
most important issue facing the American public law system as it en-
ters this century: how the Constitution will adapt to the globalization
of political, economic, and security affairs. As this Part will explain,
American intervention in Kosovo via multilateral organizations is
merely an example of broader developments in economic, environ-
mental, and security affairs. In each of these areas, problems that
have become increasingly transnational in scope have called for regu-
latory solutions from international institutions, rather than solely
through national self-help.
Kosovo provides an early example of the constitutional issues that
will arise with increasing frequency as governmental power comes to
be exercised by international institutions. During the Kosovo opera-
tion, the Clinton administration apparently delegated federal author-
ity to non-U.S. officers, suggested that treaty obligations provided jus-
tification for the intervention, and acted inconsistently with
international law. Future military and nonmilitary cooperation with
other nations may raise similar issues about the domestic legal author-
ity of international organizations, the relationships between treaties
and constitutional authority, and conflicts between international and
domestic law. This Part will address these issues by describing global-
ization and its effects on the American legal system, discussing the
ability of American troops to serve in multilateral operations, and ex-
ploring the President's authority over treaty obligations and interna-
tional law.
118 See STANLEY EUiNs & ERIc McKrcK, THm AGE OF FEDERALISM 360-62 (1993)
(describing legal and political context of Pacificus-Helividius exchange).
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A. Globalization and the American Legal System
It is commonplace to hear that globalization is disrupting differ-
ent aspects of everyday life. Markets and corporate operations today
easily stretch across national borders. Advances in technology, com-
munications, and transportation have allowed events abroad to impact
domestic markets and institutions more quickly and more profoundly
than in the past. Environmental problems that once were considered
domestic, such as pollution, have become international in scope. Cer-
tain forms of crime, such as the distribution of illegal drugs and
money laundering, now stretch across national borders. Even issues
vital to national security, such as the proliferation of nuclear, biologi-
cal, and chemical weapons, have expanded to include the activities of
many nations. These problems, once viewed as wholly within the
powers of individual nations to address, often now require interna-
tional solutions to be fully comprehensive and effective. Correspond-
ingly, policy initiatives have created new forms of international coop-
eration that include multiple parties, establish independent inter-
national organizations, and pierce the veil of the nation-state and seek
to regulate individual private conduct. Kosovo is an example of these
developments in international regulation and public law, and as such,
it demonstrates the constitutional difficulties that may afflict other ef-
forts to enforce public policy through international organizations,
rather than domestic organs of government.
While perhaps necessary to meet international goals, these novel
arrangements and institutions create difficulties because of their in-
trusiveness into what was once under the exclusive preserve of the
domestic political and legal system. In this century, the American le-
gal system must determine how or whether it will allow governmental
sovereignty to be transferred to international policymakers, consistent
with the Constitution. Events in Kosovo serve as a prime example of
the sharpening tension between the demands of international coop-
eration and the domestic legal system. Historically, the Balkans have
been a tinderbox for broader European wars that have called upon
American intervention to restore peace and stability. American and
European policymakers feared that conduct that once was considered
domestic now threatened to cause wider disruptions to European se-
curity. Serbia's course of repression, for example, produced a stream
of refugees that threatened to destabilize neighboring countries, and
ultimately our European allies. Widespread human rights violations
not only offended European and international norms, but might even
have provoked intervention by regional powers, raising the possibility
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of conflict between greater powers and perhaps NATO allies 1 9
Responses to this transnational problem seemed to require a mul-
tilateral solution. No individual European nation had the military or
political wherewithal to force Serbia to end its aggression. It was
equally unlikely that the United States would unilaterally intervene so
far from home, in a nation with close cultural and historical ties to its
former Cold War enemy, where its direct national interests were hard
to define. Operating through the multilateral structure of NATO al-
lowed member nations to gather their collective resources to address
the risks posed by events in Kosovo. Multilateralism allowed the
NATO nations, particularly the United States, to submerge the identi-
fication of any single nation's interest as dominant in the operation.
NATO may have presented a less threatening front to nations, such as
Russia, that sympathized with Serbia and might have feared an inter-
vention so close to its own borders. Kosovo signaled the transforma-
tion of NATO from a defensive alliance, whose primary goals were to
contain Soviet expansionism and to promote European reconstruc-
tion,12 to a multilateral organization that engaged in pro-active opera-
tions to pre-empt threats to regional security.
B. Sovereignty and Multilateralism: The Case of
Military Command
Notwithstanding the benefits of multilateral action, intervention
in Kosovo raises difficult questions concerning the interaction of in-
ternational organizations with domestic constitutional structures.
One significant issue is whether the President can send American
troops to serve under foreign command. During the Kosovo opera-
tion, for example, overall command of the intervention remained in
the hands of General Wesley Clark, an American officer, who served
both as NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Europe ("SACEUR")
and as commander-in-chief of the U.S.-European Command. Al-
though he answered to President Clinton, the Secretary General of
NATO, and the heads of NATO's member nations, Clark's dual role
meant that strategic command of U.S. forces rested in the hands of an
American general. American troops, however, could serve under
119 For a general discussion of the political and military background to the Ameri-
can and NATO intervention in Kosovo, see generally Editorial Comments: NATO's
Kosovo Intervention, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 824 (1999) (essays by Professors Henkin, Wedg-
wood, Chancey, Chinkin, Falk, Franck, and Reisman on Kosovo).
120 See, e.g., THOMAS ALAN ScHWARTz, AMERICA'S GERMANY: JOHNJ. MCCLOY AND
THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY passim (1991).
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Clark's various subordinates, some of whom were non-U.S. officers,
such as British General Sir Michael Jackson, who commanded the
16,000 NATO troops stationed in Macedonia during the air war, and
then led the NATO ground forces that essentially have occupied
Kosovo.1 In other deployments ordered by President Clinton, such
as those in Somalia and Bosnia, American forces attacked military tar-
gets at the instruction of non-U.S. commanders acting under the
authority either of NATO or the U.N.12
President Clinton's willingness to send American troops into
combat under non-U.S. officers appears to be unprecedented. Before
analyzing the constitutional nature of the administration's approach
to multilateral operations, it is useful first to distinguish among four
different levels of military command. First is policy command, which
refers to policies that guide the conduct of international relations and
national strategy. 23 Second, these policies establish the objectives for
strategic command, which translates national policy into more con-
crete military plans. These are developed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff
and the Secretary of Defense. 124 Third, strategic plans guide officers
who exercise operational command over corps and divisions and are
charged with supervising subordinate officers, organizing forces, and
directing their missions, but who do not actually issue orders directly
to troops.12 Fourth, those officers that directly control troops, who
employ units in combat and determine their specific use, exercise tac-
tical command. 26
American experience in modem alliance warfare suggests that
while the political branches have allowed the transfer only of certain
levels of command to non-U.S. officers, they have reserved most forms
of command solely for American military officers. PresidentWoodrow




12 See David Kaye, Are There Limits to Military Alliance? Presidential Power to Place
American Troops Under Non-American Commanders, 5 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMPORARY
PROBLEDS 399, 438-43 (1995) (describing U.N. and NATO presence in Bosnia and
U.S. presence in Somalia).
See EDWARD LuTTWAK & STUART KOEHL, THE DICTIONARY OF MODERN WAR 466
(1991) (defining policy).
1 SeeJOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DICTIONARY OF MIuTARY
NDASSOCTEDTEERMs 349-350 (1987).
125 See id. at 262; LuTw.AK& KOEHL, supra note 123, at 442 (defining operational).
126 See JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, supra note 124, at 363; LUTrVAK & KOEHL, supra
note 123, at 598 (defining tactical).
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Wilson and General John Pershing, for example, resisted efforts dur-
ing World War I to incorporate American troops immediately into
British and French units. Throughout the conflict, President Wilson
maintained policy command, General Pershing retained operational
command, and subordinate American officers exercised tactical
command of the American Expeditionary Force. In response to Ger-
many's last-ditch offensive in March 1918, however, the allied political
leadership delegated strategic command to French General Foch, al-
though American officers from General Pershing on down retained
operational and tactical command."7 During World War II, President
Roosevelt and General George Marshall decided to develop both pol-
icy and strategic plans jointly with the British Prime Minister and the
British chiefs of staff 128 Although officers of different nationalities
could exercise operational command-British Field Marshal Bernard
Montgomery led the Normandy invasion, under the command of the
Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, General Dwight
Eisenhower-tactical command of units generally remained in the
hands of their national commanders. Only American officers exer-
cised the authority to both coerce and discipline American units and
129
troops.
Postwar conflicts do not appear to have changed this practice. Al-
though the United Nations Charter called for the creation of a U.N.
military force composed of national units placed at the Security
Council's policy, strategic, and operational command,'s the ideal of
an international military force died with the advent of the Cold War."'
Like other major military powers, the United States never concluded
127 See MichaelJ. Glennon & Allison R. Hayward, Collective Security and the Constitu-
tion: Can the Commander in Chief Power Be Delegated to the United Nations?, 82 GEO. L.J.
1573, 1584-86 (1994) (discussing Americans serving under foreign command); Kaye,
supra note 122, at 420-25 (explaining that non-American officers sometimes shared
strategic and operational command in First World War); see also DAVID F. TRASK, THE
UNITED STATES IN THE SUPREME WAR CouNca.L 23-24 (1961) (discussing the establish-
ment of the Supreme War Council); Tasker H. Bliss, The Evolution of the United Com-
mand, FOREIGN AFF., Dec 15, 1922, at 29-30 (discussing unified command under Gen-
eral Foch).
128 See Kaye, supra note 122, at 425-28 (discussing the consolidation of British and
American authority).
129 See id. at 428 (stating that American troops were not subjected to British Com-
manders' "coercive" authority); see also Richard M. Leighton, Allied Unity of Command in
the Second World War A Study in Regional Military Organization, 67 POL. Sci. Q. 399, 402,
425 (1952) (discussing the power to coerce).
ISO See U.N. CHARTER art. 43.
1 See Glennon & Hayward, supra note 127, at 1574 (asserting that the superpower
deadlock of the Cold War halted the development of collective security forces).
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the necessary agreements to place designated units under U.N. com-
mand and control. In the two large-scale military conflicts sanctioned
by the U.N., the Korean War and the Persian Gulf War, American
generals exercised strategic command over the allied military, while
American officers maintained operational and tactical command over
American troops.1 2 As purely American interventions, the use of
force in places such as Vietnam, Grenada, and Panama did not raise
questions of multilateral command.
Bucking this history, the Clinton administration for the first time
assigned American troops to the operational and tactical command of
non-U.S. officers. Responding to congressional efforts to stop this
new policy, 33 the administration claimed a broad constitutional power
in the President to delegate military command authority to any per-
son. In an opinion by the Office of Legal Counsel of the U.S. De-
partment of Justice ("OLC"), the administration asserted that con-
gressional proposals to prohibit foreign command of U.S. troops
violated the President's commander-in-chief and foreign affairs pow-
ers.13 According to OLC, the commander-in-chief Clause "commits to
the President alone the power to select the particular personnel who
are to exercise tactical and operational control over U.S. forces. "' To
prevent the President from "acting on [his] military judgment con-
cerning the choice of the commanders," even if that commander is an
agent of the United Nations, would impermissibly violate both his
Commander-in-Chief power and his constitutional ability to conduct
diplomacy.13 Because "U.N. peacekeeping missions involve multilat-
eral arrangements that require delicate and complex accommoda-
132 See generally DEAN ACHESON, PRESENT AT THE CREATION 402-13, 420-25, 445-55,
467-77 (1969) (Korea); GEORGE BusH & BRENT ScowcROFr, A WORLD TRANSFORMED
302-492 (1998) (Persian Gulf).
133 In response, Congress considered legislation in 1996 to prohibit the expendi-
ture of any funds for American armed forces that served under U.N. operational or
tactical command. Section 3 of H.R. 3308, 104th Cong. (1996), required that "funds
appropriated or otherwise made available for the Department of Defense may not be
obligated or expended for activities of any element of the armed forces that after the
date of the enactment of this section is placed under United Nations operational or
tactical control." The bill defined U.N. "command" as command by an official acting
on behalf of the U.N. in a peacekeeping or similar operation, where the senior military
commander of the force is not an active duty U.S. military officer. Id.
134 See Memorandum from Alan J. Kreczko, Special Assistant to the President and
Legal Adviser to the National Security Council, Placing of United States Armed Forces Un-
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tions of a variety of interests and concerns, including those of the na-
tions that provide troops or resources," OLC argued, a mission's suc-
cess may depend upon the commander's nationality, or on the "de-
gree to which the operation is perceived as a U.N. activity" and not
that solely of the United States.
137
While it identifies and addresses the heart of the issue, the Clinton
administration's justification fails to convince, primarily because it
constructs a boundless principle that does not account for historical
practice. According to OLC, the President's Commander-in-Chief
power allows him to select anyone at all to lead American troops into
potentially life-or-death situations, even non-U.S. officials. OLC ap-
pears to maintain that the President has complete discretion over the
decision; he need not even believe that delegating all aspects of com-
mand authority is necessary for reasons of national security. OLC's
opinion also seems to contemplate that the President could delegate
command to individuals, regardless of their relationship, if any, to the
federal government. Under OLC's reasoning, the President could
place in command a Senator or Supreme CourtJustice, any state offi-
cial, or even private individuals, in addition to international officials,
foreign officials, or even foreign private citizens, without having to
appoint them officers of the United States. This is not to say that the
President cannot "deputize" American private citizens to assist him in
executing the laws, only that when he does so they must become offi-
cers of the United States, as required by the Appointments Clause,
and become subject to the oath requirement of Article VI.s The Ap-
pointments Clause, in combination with other provisions of Article I,
however, seem to bar the appointment of foreign officials as officers
of the United States without specific congressional consent.139
137 Id (emphasis omitted).
138 All officers of the United States are required to take an oath to support the
Constitution. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 3. If the President could delegate authority to
individuals who are not officers of the United States, they could wield federal power
but without any responsibility to uphold and defend the Constitution.
139 OLC did noJ claim that Congress had given the President the statutory author-
ity to appoint, or deputize, non-officers to U.S. military command in certain situations.
Even if such a statutory authority exists, it would come into conflict with Article I, Sec-
tion 9, Clause 7, which declares that:
No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States: And no Person
holding any Office of Profit or Trust under them, shall, without the Consent
of the Congress, accept of any present, Emolument, Office, or Title of any
kind whatever, from any King, Prince, or foreign State.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9. This section seems to create a rule that an officer of the United
States cannot serve as an official in any foreign government, which might make perfect
sense given the concerns that the Framers might have had about potentially conflicting
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Further, OLC's argument runs up against the unbroken historical
practice of previous commanders-in-chief. Presidents apparently have
never agreed to delegate either policy or tactical command to non-
U.S. officers. Indeed, in only one instance, under the specter of an
Allied collapse in World War I, has a President transferred strategic
command outside the U.S. command structure. Even though Presi-
dents have granted operational control to foreign commanders, they
have circumscribed that delegation by reserving coercive and discipli-
nary authority over American troops for American commanders only.
Even in the recent war against Serbia, American military leaders have
sought to avoid continuous service by American troops under foreign
command by giving each national military contingent a separate sec-
tor of Kosovo to administer. OLC's approach, however, would allow
the President to vest even tactical control over American forces to for-
eign commanders, would permit foreign commanders to exercise co-
ercive and disciplinary authority over American soldiers, and would
even provide for the amalgamation of American soldiers into foreign
or international military units-something that no President has ever
dared before.
Most importantly, the Clinton administration's legal justification
for its recent multilateral command policy fails to respect the Consti-
tution's limitations on the transfer of federal power to entities that are
not directly responsible to the American people. In a different con-
text, I have outlined the constitutional difficulties with delegating
governmental power outside of the national government.4  First,
placing American troops under foreign command seems inconsistent
with the Supreme Court's recent jurisprudence interpreting the Ap-
pointments Clause.141 While much recent academic writing on the
Clause has focused on the relative roles of the President and Senate in
loyalties to the United States. While Section 9 says that Congress can grant a person an
exception to this rule on a case-by-case basis, it seems doubtful that Congress could
enact a general rule waiving the constitutional provision in all cases whatsoever.
140 See generally John C. Yoo, New Sovereignty and the Old Constitution: The Chemical
Weapons Convention and the Appointments Clause, 15 CONST. COMMENTARY 87, 116
(1998) [hereinafterYoo, New Sovereignty].
1 The Appointments Clause declares that the President
shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall
appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the su-
preme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments
are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law:
but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers,
as they think proper, in the President alone, to the Courts of Law, or in the
Heads of Departments.
U.S. CoNST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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appointing judges,'4 the Court has articulated the Clause's broader
function in ensuring that federal power is exercised only by federal
officers accountable to the people's elected representatives.'4 As first
stated by the Court in Buckley v. Valeo, the Appointments Clause re-
quires that those exercising substantial authority under federal law
must undergo appointment according to the Clause's terms.44 Ac-
cording to the Court's subsequent opinions, this rule prevents Con-
gress from transferring executive law enforcement authority to indi-
viduals not responsible to the President or his subordinates.'4 The
transfer of military command, pursuant to NATO or U.N. obligations,
threatens this principle by allowing the President or the treatymakers
to transfer executive power to individuals independent of presidential
control.
146
Furthermore, the Appointments Clause plays more than a separa-
tion of powers role in maintaining the balance between the Congress,
the treatymakers, and the President. As Chief Justice Rehnquist has
written for the Court, "The Clause is a bulwark against one branch ag-
grandizing its power at the expense of another branch, but it is more:
it 'preserves another aspect of the Constitution's structural integrity by
preventing the diffusion of the appointment power. 147 According to
142 SeeJohn 0. McGinnis, The President, the Senate, the Constitution, and the Confirma-
tion Process: A Reply to Professors Strauss and Sunstein, 71 TEX. L. REV. 633, 638-39 (1993);
David A. Strauss & Cass R. Sunstein, The Senate, the Constitution, and the Confirmation Pro-
cess, 101 YALE L.J. 1491, 1502-12 (1992);John C.Yoo, CriticizingJudges, 1 GREEN BAG 2d
277, 278 (1998).
143 See, e.g., Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 663 (1997); Ryder v. United
States, 515 U.S. 177, 180-84 (1995); Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 169-76 (1994);
Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868, 884 (1991); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 135
(1976).
144 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 132.
145 See Edmond, 520 U.S. at 659; see also Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 922-23
(1997).
146 There can be little doubt that if the President delegates command over Ameri-
can troops to foreign or international officers, those officers will exercise substantial
authority under federal law. Under the Code of Military Justice, an American soldier
who refuses to obey the orders of a superior officer is subject to potentially severe pen-
alties, including death or long-term imprisonment. See 10 U.S.C. § 890(2) (1994) (dis-
obeying a superior commissioned officer, during time of war, is punishable by death or
other punishment as a court-martial may direct); 10 U.S.C. § 891(2) (1994) (disobey-
ing a warrant, noncommissioned, or petty officer can be punished as court-martial
shall direct); 10 U.S.C. § 892(1) (1994) (disobeying a lawful general order or regula-
tion shall be punished as a court-martial shall direct); 10 U.S.C. § 892(2) (1994) (dis-
obeying any other lawful order shall be punishable as court-martial may direct).
47 Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177, 182 (1995) (quoting Freytag, 501 U.S. at
878).
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the Court, the Clause prevents the diffusion of federal power by limit-
148ing its exercise only to those who undergo the appointment process.
The Framers, the Justices believed, centralized the appointments
power because they feared the vesting of power in officeholders who
were not accountable to the electorate, as had occurred during the
colonial period.
A centralized appointments process prevents the national gov-
ernment, as a whole, from concealing or confusing the lines of gov-
ernmental authority and responsibility so that the people may hold
the actions of the government accountable. Allowing the transfer of
command authority to non-U.S. officers threatens this basic principle
of government accountability. International or foreign officials have
no obligation to pursue American policy, they do not take an oath to
uphold the Constitution, nor can any American official hold them re-
sponsible for their deeds. Granting military command to such indi-
viduals undermines the Clause's purpose in promoting a certain level
of government accountability because it transfers federal power to
those who lie outside the control of the people.
Second, the Constitution's creation of a unitary executive militates
against the delegation of command authority to a foreign com-
mander. Whether one agrees with the formalist or functionalist side
in the debate over the separation of powers,1 transferring power out-
side of the federal government fundamentally conflicts with the con-
cept of unified executive power. For formalists, any exercise of fed-
eral authority by an individual who is not a member of the executive
branch, and thus is not removable by the President, violates the sepa-
ration of powers because it prevents the President from fully control-
ling the implementation of federal law. 5 Once the President dele-
gates authority to a foreign commander, he cannot issue orders to
that commander, backed up by the threat of removal and discipline,
as he could to an American officer, even though that foreign official
may issue directives to subordinate American soldiers. In fact, as the
Clinton administration has noted, the independence of such foreign
commanders from American control is crucial to the success of their
148 See id at 182-84 (noting that the Clause prevents diffusion of the appointment
power).
149 See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's Power to Exe-
cute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541 (1994) (formalist); Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Danger-
ous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725 (1996) (functionalist); Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sun-
stein, The President and theAdministration, 94 COLuM. L. REv. 1 (1994) (functionalist).ISO See Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 149, at 593-99.
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missions.' 5' One of the very purposes of multilateralism is to create
the impression that a military operation falls under the aegis of a neu-
tral international organization and hence does not represent the in-
terests of a single nation. While functionalists may be willing to accept
some conditions on the removal power, they have not endorsed the
delegation of federal power to those who are completely insulated
from presidential control. '  Further, functionalists could object to
foreign command of American troops because it would undermine
accountability in government. Voters cannot hold either the Presi-
dent or Congress accountable if decisions are made by those who are
not members of either branch .
Third, the non-delegation doctrine reinforces the limitations im-
posed by the Appointments Clause and the unitary executive on the
delegation of command authority outside of the American military.
Recent decisions by the Supreme Court and the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the D.C. Circuit suggest that the federal courts have begun to take
the non-delegation doctrine more seriously than in the past.'TM As
formulated by the Court, the doctrine prohibits Congress from dele-
gating its enumerated power to another branch unless it has stated an
objective, prescribed methods to achieve it, and articulated intelligible
standards to guide administrative discretion.5 These standards pro-
vide the courts, Congress, and the public with some objective factors
to review whether the power is being exercised within the limits of the
151 See supra text accompanying notes 136-37.
1 See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 691-92 (1988) (noting that "good
cause" removal of the independent counsel still allows the President to retain authority
over the counsel's duties); see also Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 149, at 106-16 (claim-
ing that although there are numerous independent agencies, complete independence
from the President would still raise constitutional problems).
153 One might respond to this argument by pointing out that if the President dis-
approves of the actions of the foreign commander, he or she may take back the power
of command-in a sense, removing the foreign officer. This point, however, is not
fully convincing. First, the question whether a delegation of power violates the non-
delegation doctrine does not turn on whether Congress can terminate the delegation;
Congress can always enact another statute to reverse an earlier delegation. Second, a
presidential decision to undo a delegation of command may prove to be too little, too
late, for an American military unit engaged in combat or in the midst of a dangerous
situation as a result of a foreign commander's decisions.
154 See, e.g., Clinton v. New York, 524 U.S. 417, 442-47 (1998) (striking down the
President's use of the Line Item Veto Act where its effect was to amend acts of Con-
gress, thus violating the Presentment Clause); American Trucking Ass'n v. EPA, 175
F.3d 1027, 1033 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (per curiam).
5 See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371-79 (1989) (approving a congres-
sional delegation of power where the goals were clearly set out, the purposes asserted,
and the scope of the delegation was definitively confined).
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delegation. Transfer of military command to foreign or international
officials threatens the purposes of this rule. If the President delegates
command authority over American troops entirely outside of the fed-
eral government, neither Congress nor the public can determine
whether foreign or international commanders are exercising their
authority according to American standards, nor can they enforce their
policy wishes through the usual legal or political methods available
when power is delegated within the executive branch.
A brief examination of the original understanding supports this
reading of the Constitution's promotion of government accountabil-
ity. Rejecting the idea that sovereignty resided in a king, or even in
the government, the revolutionaries located sovereignty in the people,
for whom government officials served as agents.5 6 One of the colo-
nists' chief complaints against the British was the rule of imperial offi-
cials, who were appointed by a king, and the lack of representation in
government "There is," John Adams wrote in 1776, "something very
unnatural and odious in a Government 1000 Leagues off. [A] whole
government of our own Choice, managed by Persons whom We love,
revere, and can confide in, has charms in it for which Men will
fight." 57 The ideal of popular sovereignty, which infused the revolu-
tionary and ratification periods, conceived of all government servants
as ultimately answerable to the people. In drafting a new system of
government, the Framers sought to advance this principle by dividing
the appointments power between the President and Senate to prevent
either a single individual or a legislative faction from abusing ap-
pointments to their personal or group advantage.'ts
15 See WOOD, supra note 101, at 344-62 (chronicling the development of popular
sovereignty); Akhil R. Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1429-37
(1987) (examing constitutional debate on where sovereignty resided and its ultimate
relocation from government to the people).
157 WOOD, supra note 101, at 78.
15 SeeYoo, New Sovereignty, supra note 140, at 109. Forcing the President and Sen-
ate to share the appointments power opens up the selection and performance of pub-
lic officials to public scrutiny, and thereby enhances responsibility and accountability
in government. As Alexander Hamilton wrote in Federalist No. 77, because the execu-
tive had to send nominees to the Senate, "the circumstances attending an appoint-
ment, from the mode of conducting it, would naturally become matters of notoriety;
and the public would be at no loss to determine what part had been performed by the
different actors." TIM FEDERALIST No. 77, at 461 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Ros-
siter ed., 1961). If the branches approved an unsuitable nominee, both would suffer at
the hands of the public. "If an ill appointment should be made," Hamilton wrote, "the
executive for nominating and the senate for approving would participate though in
different degrees in the opprobrium and disgrace." Id. In contrast, for a state such as
NewYork where secrecy prevailed over appointments, "all idea of responsibility is lost."
1717
1718 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 148:1673
Delegation of military command to foreign or international offi-
cers undermines these principles. Under recent Clinton administra-
tion initiatives, individuals who have not undergone the executive,
congressional, and public scrutiny that attends appointments, and
who are not responsible to the American political system, enjoy the
authority to issue orders to American soldiers in life-threatening situa-
tions. Independent of the executive branch, foreign commanders
need not obey presidential directives, need not follow American laws
and regulations, and cannot be removed or disciplined by the Presi-
dent. If Congress or the people disagree with military policy or disap-
prove of the execution of a military operation, they have no political
avenue to oversee the officials who are in command. They cannot
demand that the President remove an official for incompetence, fail-
ure to obey orders, or disagreement over policy. This runs counter to
the Appointments Clause's basic goal of guaranteeing that the people
have a voice in the selection of officials who exercise federal powers,
and of allowing the people, through the political system, to hold their
elected representatives accountable for "an ill appointment."15 9
Although previous presidents have allowed command to flow
through foreign commanders, particularly those allied with the
United States in World Wars I and II, they did so in very different, and
important, ways. The precise structure assumed by those forms of co-
operation, however, preserved rather than undermined principles of
government accountability. It appears that no commander-in-chief
before President Clinton has delegated policy or tactical command to
non-U.S. officers, nor has any President allowed a non-U.S. officer to
coerce or discipline American troops. It also appears that strategic
command over American troops has been clearly exercised by a non-
U.S. officer only once.10 When presidents have delegated command,
it has usually been at the operational level. 61 Operational command,
however, does not raise the same problems posed by tactical or policy
command. It does not vest foreign officers with the power to actually
issue directives to American soldiers that have the force of law behind
Id. at 11. A shared appointment power allows the people to carefully evaluate their
agents as they are appointed, and to hold their representatives responsible should the
appointees abuse the public trust. SeeYoo, New Sovereignty, supra note 140, at 110-11. By
forcing the government to conduct appointments in an open manner, the Constitu-
tion promotes government accountability, and ultimately representative democracy.
THE FEDERALIST No. 77, at 461 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton J. Rossiter ed.,
1961).
160 See supra text accompanying notes 125-83 (discussing the Normandy invasion as
led by British Field Marshall Bernard Montgomery).
See supra notes 122-32 and accompanying text.
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them. Rather, American military officers, in consultation with Ameri-
can political and military leaders-who still retain policy and strategic
command-can determine whether to comply with those orders at the
tactical level.'62
On this point, the delegation of operational command resembles
the relationship of American domestic law to certain international
norms. International organizations and conventions can place legal
obligations upon the United States, such as a WTO panel finding that
American environmental regulations violate GATT national treatment
rules, or they can even call upon the United States to meet some non-
binding, aspirational goal.16 The United States still remains free,
however, to choose how to implement its international obligations, or
even whether to violate them and suffer retaliation. In either case, of-
ficers of the United States make the decisions and exercise the power
of federal law to enforce them. Similarly, if non-U.S. commanders
possess operational command, but do not have the authority to coerce
or discipline American troops who disobey their orders, they exercise
no greater power than any other international organization whose rul-
ings the United States is free, as a matter of domestic law, to adopt or
reject. American commanders at the policy and strategic levels still
may countermand any order, and American officers at the tactical
level are responsible for deciding whether to implement orders of
non-U.S. commanders. American officers still retain the authority of
federal law in coercing and disciplining American troops. The deci-
sion, therefore, whether and how to harmonize the actions of the
American government with international requirements still rests with
officers of the United States, who are appointed pursuant to the Ap-
162 NATO's military structure for the occupation of Kosovo attempts to minimize
the likelihood that U.S. troops will have to serve on a regular basis under foreign or
international command. Each nation that has contributed troops to the NATO
force-the United States, Great Britain, Germany, France, and Italy-bears primary
control over a different geographic sector in Kosovo. The forces in each sector are
commanded by a brigade commander from the same nation (thus, in the United
States sector the troops are under the control of an American officer) who in turn re-
ports to General Sir MichaelJackson, a British officer. GeneralJackson, who holds op-
erational command, reports to the theater commander, Admiral Ellis, who in turn re-
ports to General Wesley Clark, Supreme Allied Commander in Europe. See <http:
//vw.defenselink.mil/news/Jun1999/t06111999_tO6llasd.html>. This arrangement
does not preclude the forces of one nation from engaging in operations in a sector
under the control of another NATO country, and thus serving under the tactical
command of a foreign officer.
16 SeeJohn C. Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution: Treaties, Non-Self-Execution, and the
Original Understanding 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1955, 1968 & n.57 (1999) [hereinafterYoo,
Globalism and the Constitution].
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pointments Clause and remain accountable in the American political
system.
In raising the prospect that non-U.S. officers may receive tactical
command, the Clinton administration threatens to introduce an un-
precedented approach to American military intervention in this cen-
tury. In seeking to submerge appearances of American unilateralism
within broader multilateral organizations, President Clinton has
placed American forces at the disposal and command of foreign or
international officials. While this may be necessary in order to achieve
the goals of working through an independent, neutral international
organization, it creates significant tension with American constitu-
tional principles of government accountability and popular sover-
eignty, as promoted by the Appointments Clause, the unitary execu-
tive, and the non-delegation doctrine. One approach that might
resolve this potential conflict between international cooperation and
American constitutionalism is for presidents and military leaders to
transfer only strategic or operational command to non-U.S. officers.
Retaining policy and tactical command, combined with the right to
coerce and discipline soldiers, would ensure that control over the ex-
ercise and enforcement of federal law would remain with individuals
responsible to the American government, as required by the Constitu-
tion.
C. The President, Treaty Obligations, and International Law
Beyond the issue of military command, Kosovo raises issues of a
constitutional dimension concerning the relationship between inter-
national organizations and law, on the one hand, and American do-
mestic law and institutions, on the other. Although the Clinton ad-
ministration failed to provide a legal justification for its use of military
force in the Balkans, the President referred to American obligations
to NATO as one of the primary reasons for the war. The absence of
international law commentators from the debate notwithstanding,
some foreign relations law scholars in the past have suggested that ful-
filling our treaty obligations could provide the President with the con-
stitutional authority to use force without further congressional
authorization.!" Such a claim raises two significant foreign relations
164 See, e.g., Thomas M. Franck & Faiza Patel, Agora: The Gulf Crisis in International
and Foreign Relations Law, UN Police Action in Lieu of War: "The Old Order Changeth, " 85
AM.J. INT'L L. 63, 68 (1991). For a trenchant criticism of Franck and Patel, see Glen-
non & Hayward, supra note 127, at 1598 n.144.
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law questions: whether the President can use treaty obligations to
conduct wars without congressional cooperation, and whether the
President can take the United States into war in violation of interna-
tional law. Practice during the Kosovo war indicates, contrary to the
claims of many international law scholars, that the President gains lit-
te additional constitutional authority when acting pursuant to a
treaty, but that he remains free to violate international law in the na-
tional interest. If the Presidents of this century intend to involve the
United States more deeply in multilateral military operations, these
questions will arise with greater frequency as future commanders-in-
chief make war more often pursuant to treaties and the demands of
international organizations.
This Article's vision of war powers suggests that the President
need not rely upon treaty obligations in order to conduct wars without
congressional authorization. One would not have gotten this impres-
sion, however, from the previous debates among international lawyers.
In the aftermath of the Persian Gulf War, for example, several promi-
nent international law commentators argued about the relevance to
domestic war powers of the U.N. Security Council Resolution author-
izing the use of force against Iraq.165 Professor Thomas Franck, for
example, has maintained that if the Security Council issues a resolu-
tion authorizing military intervention, then the President has the in-
dependent constitutional authority to send American troops into hos-
tilities. "Such compliance by the President with international law is
not prohibited," Professor Franck and Faiza Patel write, "indeed, it is
required-by the Constitution."16 6 In the case of the Persian Gulf War,
according to Professor Franck, once the Security Council issued Reso-
lution 678, the President had the authority, indeed had the constitu-
tional obligation, to attack Iraq.167 Professor Michael Glennon, for
one, takes the opposite tack. He responds that even if Resolution 678
imposed a mandatory obligation on member nations, a United Na-
tions obligation cannot alter the domestic allocation of war powers. 68Because Professor Glennon is one of the many academics who believes
16 See S.C. Res. 678 (Nov. 29, 1990), reproduced in United Nations: Security Council
Resolutions Concerning IraqiAgression, 29 I.L.M. 1565 (1990).
166 Franck & Patel, supra note 164, at 72.
167 See id. at 74.
16 See Michael J. Glennon, Agora: The Gulf Crisis in International and Foreign Rela-
tions Law, UN Police Action in Lieu of War: The Constitution and Chapter VII of the United
Nations Charte, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 74, 81 (1991). Professor Glennon expands on these
views and applies them to more recent interventions in Glennon & Hayward, supra
note 127, at 1595-1601.
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that Congress must authorize all uses of force, he argues that a treaty
obligation cannot eliminate the need for congressional approval of
the use of force. Under this view, a treaty obligation would count for
little more than, as Professor Eugene Rostow once famously said, a let-
ter from one's mother.1 9
The text and history of the constitutional allocation of war powers
indicate that this argument is beside the point. Because the President
already has the domestic constitutional authority to initiate military
hostilities without any authorizing legislation, he need not rely upon
treaty obligations for legal justification. President Clinton did not re-
quire the U.N.'s permission to deploy troops into Haiti or Somalia or
to send the Air Force into combat in Bosnia, because his commander-
in-chief and executive powers already gave him sufficient constitu-
tional power to do so. This is not to say, of course, that the treaty de-
mands of the U.N. or of our allies should not affect the President's
decisionmaking concerning the use of force. It should be made clear,
however, that treaties exert an impact in the realm of international
politics and foreign policy, rather than in constitutional law. Even if
treaties had some constitutional emanations on war decision making,
the President's duty to implement treaties (due to his Article II, Sec-
tion 3 duty to faithfully execute the laws), and to terminate treaties
unilaterally allows him to override or obey any treaty obligation.
A more interesting and difficult question is what impact treaties
should have, if any, upon the other domestic actors in the struggle
over the use of force. Even though treaties may provide no constitu-
tional boost to the President's discretion as commander-in-chief, some
still may believe that treaties should exert a pull upon Congress in
support of presidential warmaking. Under Professor Franck's theory,
for example, a President armed with a Security Council Resolution
could claim that Congress had the constitutional responsibility to
fund any use of force authorized by the U.N. or NATO. 70 Similarly,
according to Professor Henkin, "Congress is internationally obligated,
and has the power under the Constitution, to enact laws necessary and
proper to carry out the obligations and responsibilities of the United
States under the [U.N.] Charter."'7' If treaties are laws of the land,
then until they are repealed, these scholars argue, Congress has a con-
169 See Michael J. Glennon, The Senate Role in Treaty Ratification, 77 AM. J. INT'L L.
257, 264 (1983).
170 See Frank & Patel, supra note 164, at 74.
171 Louis HENKN, FOREIGN AFFAiRS AND THE U.S. CoNsn'uON 252 (2d ed.
1996).
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stitutional duty to fulfill a treaty's terms even if it disagrees with execu-
tive foreign policy or the objectives underlying the treaty.
72
Such claims can trace their roots back to Alexander Hamilton. In
1796, Jeffersonians claimed that Congress could doom the controver-
sialJay Treaty by refusing to enact implementing legislation.173 Hamil-
ton responded that because the Supremacy Clause made treaties the
law of the land, the House had no right to consider the treaty on the
merits or to refuse to enact the necessary legislation. Wrote Hamil-
ton,
Each house of Congress collectively as well as the members of it sepa-
rately are under a constitutional obligation to observe the injunctions of
a [treaty] and to give it effect. If they act otherwise they infringe the
constitution; the theory of which knows in such case no discretion on
their part.174
To make treaties dependent on legislative execution, Hamilton
concluded, would render the treaty power hollow. 7 "[T]here is
scarcely any species of treaty which would not clash, in some particu-
lar, with the principle of those objections," Hamilton declared.'76
"[T]he power to make treaties granted in such comprehensive and
indefinite terms and guarded with so much precaution would become
essentially nugatory."1" Hamilton's theory would require Congress to
fund automatically presidential warmaking, if those wars were under-
taken pursuant to valid treaty obligations-which Hamilton argued in
1791 was for the executive branch to determine.
This approach-essentially the theory underpinning the doctrine
of self-executing treaties-is inconsistent with the balance struck by
the Constitution between the treaty and the legislative powers.178 Both
17 This reading, however, conspicuously ignores Article I, Section 7's requirement
that "No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropria-
tions made by Law," which requires bicameralism and presentment for the authoriza-
tion of any expenditure of funds. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 7.
173 SeeYoo, Globalism and the Constitution, supra note 163, at 2082-86.
174 Alexander Hamilton, TheDefence No. 36, HERALD (NewYork),Jan. 2, 1796, in 20
THE PAPERS OF AI.EXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 72, at 4. Hamilton argued more
fully that a treaty could legislate on any matter within Congress's Article I, Section 8
power, and that any effort to read the treaty power as limited by congressional author-
ity would make it impossible for the nation to enter into treaties. See also The Defence
No. 37, HERALD (New York), Jan. 6, 1796, in 20 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON,
supra note 72, at 16-22.
17 See 20 THE PAPERS OFALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 72, at 18-22.
176 Id. at 18.
178 1d
18For a more detailed explanation, see generally John C. Yoo, Globalisin and the
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the British constitutional struggles of the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries, and the events of the framing and ratification of the Consti-
tution, indicate that the Framers understood the legislative power to
serve as a crucial check upon the executive's control over foreign af-• 179
fairs generally, and the treaty power specifically. The Framers saw a
tension between the Supremacy Clause's efforts to make treaties bind-
ing on the nation and Article I's vesting of all federal legislative power
in Congress. They resolved this problem by explicit analogy to the
British model, which allocated legislative authority to Parliament and
treatymaking power to the executive. Treaties continued to be execu-
tive in nature, as they were under the British constitution, but they
could not exercise the legislative authority granted to Congress in Ar-
ticle I. While the executive would enjoy the freedom to manage in-
ternational relations through the treatymaking power, the Framers be-
lieved that the legislative power-with its monopoly over the
regulation of domestic affairs-would provide a crucial constitutional
and political check on executive power and policies. ° As Parliament
had done vis-a-vis the Crown, Congress might use its legislative and
spending powers to frustrate or even counteract treaty obligations, in-
dependent of the wishes of the treatymakers.
Article I's vesting of legislative power in Congress gives it a block-
ing role in treaty making. By withholding implementing legislation or
funding, Congress can prevent a treaty from taking domestic effect.
In light of this understanding of the Constitution, Congress remains
free to exercise its constitutional authorities as it sees fit, regardless of
the President's claims that he is upholding treaty requirements. Even
if the U.N. or NATO directed its member nations to intervene militar-
ily, and even if these directives were considered valid treaty obligations
that amounted to the law of the land, Congress has the constitutional
discretion to use its funding and legislative powers to prevent the ex-
ecutive from fulfilling those duties. While refusing to fund actions
necessary to fulfill our treaty obligations might violate international
law, such action does not violate the Constitution. In invoking our ob-
ligations under NATO, therefore, the President may have provided a
political justification for the Kosovo war, but not one that could have
constitutionally compelled Congress to approve or support the inter-
vention. Congress's refusal to provide authorization for the war, and
its debate on the merits of funding, indicate that international law
Constitution, supra note 163, and Yoo, Treaties and Lawmaking supra note 102.
179 SeeYoo, Globalism and the Constitution, supra note 163, at 1955.
180 See id.
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scholars' views on the treaty power found little purchase during con-
sideration of the Kosovo war.
American intervention renewed a second, long-running debate-
whether the President has a constitutional duty to obey international
law. Kosovo appears to have answered this question, in that President
Clinton violated international law-without domestic objection-by
attacking a sovereign nation without Security Council approval. Un-
der the U.N. Charter, which guarantees the sovereignty and inde-
pendence of its member states, it appears that the attack upon Serbia
violated international law. Article 2(4) of the Charter decrees that
members shall "refrain... from the threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any state."1 8 ' Article
2(3) calls upon nations to settle their international disputes "by peace-
ful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and
justice, are not endangered,"8 2 and Article 2(7) declares that nothing
in the Charter "shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in
matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any
state."'83 Unless one can substantiate the difficult claim that Serbian
activities rose to the level of genocide, which would be a crime against
humanity that any nation would be authorized to stop, it seems that
the tragedies in Kosovo represented domestic matters internal to
Yugoslavia, the resolution of which the Charter rules out the use of
force.
A state may still use force, in keeping with the Charter, under two
conditions. First, if a nation is attacked in violation of Article 2(4),'18 it
may act in self-defense. Second, a nation may use force against an-
other nation if acting pursuant to Security Council authorization.
Under Article 42, the Security Council may call on member nations to
engage in "demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea,
or land forces" that it thinks "necessary to maintain international
peace and security."'ts Under Article 89,'the Security Council may is-
181 U.N.CHARTERart. 2 (4).
182 Id. art. 2(3).
1I. art. 2(7).
184 See id. art. 51.
I85 Id. art. 42. Many have argued, however, that the Security Council cannot re-
quire nations to intervene under Article 42 unless it has at its disposal national military
forces, pursuant to special agreements under Article 43. See Glennon, supra note 168,
at 77-80 (collecting sources). No agreements between the U.N. and member nations
under Article 43 ever took effect. This, however, only prevents the Security Council
from requiring member nations to take military action, not from requesting that they
do so voluntarily. The Charter also allows the Security Council to authorize police ac-
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sue recommendations that ask member nations to voluntarily take
military action to restore international peace. Unless a nation is act-
ing in self-defense, the U.N. Charter appears to require that the Secu-
rity Council must authorize all other uses of force. While one can
make (and I might subscribe to) the argument that a nation must be
able to use force to defend its national interests, even if a cross-border
invasion has not occurred, the U.N. Charter and most international
legal scholars exclude this possibility.
If this interpretation of the U.N. Charter is correct, then the
United States cannot engage in military hostilities unless attacked or
unless authorized by the Security Council. As Professor Henkin has
argued: "By adhering to the Charter, the United States has given up
the right to go to war at will."8 6 Under this approach, the Clinton
administration's military attack upon Serbia violated international law.
The United States and its allies attacked the civilian and military assets
of another sovereign nation. They did not receive either a Security
Council decision under Article 42 to engage in a police action, or an
authorization under Article 39 to use force to restore international
peace and security. It is difficult to claim, with a straight face, that
American intervention in Kosovo was necessary for purposes of na-
tional self-defense. American-led attacks in Kosovo and Serbia, there-
fore, violated international law under the theories of most interna-
tional law scholars.
Under the view promoted by many foreign relations law scholars,
the President's violation of international law should have made
Kosovo presumptively unconstitutional. For example, many leading
commentators argue that the President has a constitutional duty to
enforce customary international law.8 7  International law-either
through treaty or as federal common law-is part of the "Laws of the
Land" under Article VI's Supremacy Clause. Article II's requirement
that the President enforce the laws, according to these scholars,
means that international law must be obeyed by the President. A
President may not violate international law, just as he cannot violate a
tions by regional organizations. See U.N. CHARTER art. 53 ("The Security Council shall,
where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement
action under its authority.").
186 HENKiN, supra note 171, at 250.
187 See, e.g., MichaelJ. Glennon, Raising the Paquete Habana: Is Violation of Customary
International Law ly the Executive Unconstitutional?, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 321, 325 (1985);
Louis Henkin, International Law As Law in the United States, 82 MICH. L. REv. 1555, 1567
(1984);Jules Lobel, The Limits of Constitutional Power Conflicts Between Foreign Policy and
International Law, 71 VA. L. REV. 1071, 1179 (1985); see also Agora: May the President Vio-
late Customary InternationalLaw?, 80AM.J. INT'L L. 913 (1986).
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statute, unless he believes it to be unconstitutional. As Professor Hen-
kin has written: "There can be little doubt that the President has the
duty, as well as the authority, to take care that international law, as
part of the law of the United States, is faithfully executed." s8 While
some admit that certain forms of constitutional or statutory authority
might allow the President to violate international law, 9 others go far-
ther in claiming that the President cannot violate certain forms of in-
ternational law regardless of his domestic authority.190 These differ-
ences aside, many foreign relations scholars seem to agree that the
federal courts ought to exercise judicial review and invalidate execu-
tive action that contravenes international law.
Although the inclusion of customary international law as federal
common law is open to potentially crippling doubts,19 such arguments
might be on firmer ground when it comes to treaties, which are ex-
plicitly mentioned in the Supremacy Clause.92 If foreign relations law
scholars were correct about the binding nature of even customary in-
ternational law on the executive branch, then certainly courts could
enjoin the President from violating a more concrete form of interna-
tional law-namely the U.N. Charter-that had been adopted
through the treaty process. Nonetheless, Kosovo demonstrates that
international law imposed little restraint upon presidential action, and
188 Henkin, supra note 187, at 1567; see also Louis Henkin, The President and Interna-
tionalLaw, 80 AM.J. INT'L L. 930, 937 (1986).
189 See, e.g., Glennon, supra note 187, at 325; Henkin, supra note 188, at 936-37.
190 See Lobel, supra note 187, at 1075.
191 See Curtis A. Bradley &Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law As Federal
Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815, 817 (1997); see
also ALFRED RUBIN, ETmCs AND AUTHORTiy IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 185-206 (1997);
Philip R. Trimble, A Revisionist View of Customary International Law, 33 UCLA L. REV.
665, 672-673 (1986); Arthur M. Weisburd, The Executive Branch and InternationalLaw, 41
VAND. L. REV. 1205, 1269 (1988). For some of the responses to Professors Bradley and
Goldsmith, see Harold H. Koh, Is International Law Really State Law?, 111 HARV. L. REV.
1824, 1827 (1998); Gerald L. Neuman, Sense and Nonsense About Customary International
Law: A Response to Professors Bradley and Goldsmith, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 371, 371
(1997); Beth Stephens, The Law of Our Land: Customary International Law As Federal Law
After Erie, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 393, 396-97 (1997). Bradley and Goldsmith have re-
sponded to their critics several times. See Curtis A. Bradley &Jack L. Goldsmith III,
Federal Courts and the Incorporation of International Law, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2260 (1998);
Curtis A. Bradley &Jack L. Goldsmith, The Current Illegitimacy of International Human
Rights Litigation, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 319, 330 (1997); cf. Bradford R. Clark, Federal
Common Law: A Structural Reinterpretation, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1245 (1996).
192 I have argued elsewhere that the inclusion of treaties in Article VI places duties
upon the political branches to take measures to execute them, but that they do not
impose a constitutional duty upon the courts to execute treaties without implementing
legislation. See generallyYoo, Globalism and the Constitution, supra note 163; Yoo, Treaties
and Public Lawmaking supra note 102.
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that federal courts were not about to enforce treaty obligations so as
to restrict the commander-in-chief power.9 3 What was striking in the
American public debate over Kosovo was the almost complete absence
of any arguments, especially from international law scholars, that the
war's apparent violation of international law should pose any domestic
legal difficulties for President Clinton.
Kosovo demonstrates why these theories are flawed. The constitu-
tional text nowhere brackets presidential or federal power within the
confines of international law. When the Supremacy Clause discusses
the sources of federal law, it only enumerates the Constitution, "the
Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof,"194 and treaties, not international law. As I have argued else-
where, even the inclusion of treaties in the Supremacy Clause does
not render treaties automatically self-executing in federal court, not to
mention self-executing against the executive branch.19 Constitutional
text aside, allowing the federal courts to rely upon international law
and treaty obligations to enjoin presidential warmaking would raise
deep structural problems. Relying upon international law and treaty
obligations to block presidential warmaking could undermine the
President's control over foreign relations, his commander-in-chief
authority, and even his freedom to participate in the making of inter-
national law. Allowing international law and treaties to interfere with
the President's war power would expand the federal judiciary's
authority into areas where it has little competence, where the Consti-
tution does not textually call for its intervention, and where it risks de-
fiance by the political branches.'96 At the level of democratic theory,
conceiving of international law as a restraint on presidential warmak-
ing would allow norms of questionable democratic origin to constrain
actions validly taken under the U.S. Constitution by popularly ac-
countable national representatives.
Some might argue, however, that if the President is acting pursu-
193 In fact, it was telling that unlike previous conflicts, no prominent international
law scholars stepped forward to criticize President Clinton's war in Kosovo as a viola-
tion of international law, and hence a violation of the Constitution, or to file a lawsuit
on that basis.
194 U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
195 SeeYoo, Globalism and the Constitution, supra note 163, at 1971; Yoo, Treaties and
Public Lawmaking, supra note 102, at 2239. Non-self-execution demonstrates, in fact,
that treaty obligations often will not bind the President, which strongly indicates that
customary international law cannot do so as well.
'96 rI discuss the problems with judicial intervention in war powers disputes at more
length in Yoo, Original Understanding, supra note 10, at 194-96, 287-90, 300-02.
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ant to an inherent constitutional authority, he may violate interna-
tional law. Kosovo might not directly raise the question of the rela-
tionship between the President and international law, then, because
President Clinton was acting pursuant to his commander-in-chief
powers. While this had been the past suggestion of Professor Henkin,
it is not the view shared by scholars such as Professors Glennon,
Franck, and Jules Lobel, who appear to believe that Presidents cannot
unilaterally defy international law.19 7 Such efforts, however, to save the
primacy of international law demonstrate the internal contradictions
of this approach. The President always must act pursuant to some
authority either directly granted by the Constitution, or delegated to
him by Congress. Otherwise, he is acting ultra vires and without legal
authority of any kind. To say that the Commander-in-Chief Clause
provides the President with the power to violate international law is to
admit that virtually any valid presidential action can violate interna-
tional law, whether it be taken pursuant to the Executive Power
Clause, the President's sole organ power, or the war power. 98 Unfor-
tunately for many international law scholars, Kosovo provides a clear
demonstration of the manner in which presidents are not constitu-
tionally or legally bound by international law.
CONCLUSION
From the standpoint of the separation of powers, Kosovo shows
that international law amounts to nothing more than a constitutional
placebo. It neither helps nor hurts the relative roles of any of the
branches, no matter how much they might believe in it. As demon-
strated by the Clinton administration's bombing of Serbian targets
without U.N. sanction, international law has failed to place any real
constraints upon the President's exercise of his commander-in-chief
or executive war powers. The constitutional text and structure seems
to indicate that the executive branch enjoys the constitutional free-
dom to exercise its foreign affairs powers consistent with, or in conflict
with, international norms. Yet, international law provides no special
constitutional impetus to presidential warmaking either. Even when
they rely upon NATO or U.N. treaty obligations, presidents ought to
197 Professor Glennon, who has perhaps the most sensible view, applies the
Youngstown framework to argue that presidents cannot act in this area of shared
authority without congressional support. SeeGlennon, supra note 187, at 325.
198 One might make the argument that presidents cannot violate international law
pursuant to a legislatively delegated power, but then one must argue that Congress
cannot violate international law either.
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receive no special deference from Congress when it considers whether
to support a military intervention. The text and original understand-
ing of the Constitution permits Congress to use its plenary legislative
and funding powers to check the executive's conduct of foreign pol-
icy. In Kosovo, Congress performed this function by considering the
merits of the war in the course of funding it.
Once we have removed international law from the mix, the cen-
tral constitutional issue raised by Kosovo boils down to the familiar
debate about the allocation of war powers between President and
Congress. American international law scholars, who remained
strangely silent during the conflict, had argued during past postwar
conflicts that Presidents could not use military force without ex ante
congressional authorization. Neither President Clinton, nor Con-
gress, nor the federal courts, however, conducted themselves during
Kosovo as if this were the operating principle. Rather, in keeping with
recent historical practice, the President exercised the initiative to be-
gin military hostilities, subject to Congress's control over the purse,
which it used to consider the merits of the intervention. I believe that
this outcome finds support in the text, structure, and history of the
Constitution, which display no clear effort to undo the warmaking re-
lationship between the executive and legislative branches that pre-
vailed in the Anglo-American political system of the eighteenth cen-
tury. Under this understanding, the Clinton administration's decision
to use military force in Kosovo without a declaration of war or other
statutory authorization fell within the formal boundaries established
by the Constitution, as they would have been understood by the
Framers.
War powers analysis only begins to address the most novel consti-
tutional issue to arise from the Kosovo war. Kosovo now is the most
prominent example of the growing efforts to develop multilateral so-
lutions to the problems posed by globalization. In order to establish
international institutions capable of neutral, yet effective action, the
Clinton administration appears to believe it necessary to transfer pub-
lic authority to foreign or international commanders who are not offi-
cers of the United States. Such multilateralism is in substantial ten-
sion with principles of government accountability and popular
sovereignty, as promoted by the Appointments Clause, the unitary ex-
ecutive, and the non-delegation doctrine. Recent historical practice,
however, suggests methods in which the United States can cooperate
with other nations through international institutions without com-
promising the constitutional structures that safeguard representative
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government at home.
Unfortunately, the Clinton administration's performance in
Kosovo failed to strike the proper balance between international co-
operation and democratic government demanded by the Constitu-
tion. Since Kosovo was but an early step in what likely will be an ongo-
ing process in the twenty-first century, the next presidents will have
the opportunity to provide greater respect to the principle that only
American officials can exercise federal authority over American citi-
zens. Regardless of the approach and justifications provided by the
current administration, it seems certain that this same basic issue will
arise in a variety of different guises, as nations engage in new forms of
international cooperation in order to regulate truly global problems
and conduct. In that respect, perhaps one of the most important con-
stitutional issues that the next presidential election may determine
will be how the nation reconciles military and regulatory multilateral-
ism with domestic constitutionalism. Kosovo need not provide the
precedent on that score for the future.
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